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CENTER FOR DEFENSE TECHNOLOGY AND EDUCATION FOR 
THE MILITARY SERVICES (CDTEMS) 
The United Stares military is faced with a difficult environment; maintaining cur-
rent military strengths while transforming the military services ro meet the required 
capabilities-based emphasis for future funding, and while significantly improving 
homeland defense. The long term impact of emerging technologies on successful 
joint warfighring, the effects of homeland defense requirements on the required 
technologies and on national defense strategy, and the education requirements of 
the military forces ro effectively utilize these emerging technologies and strategies are 
not currently being addressed to the level required for rapid transformation. 
To address the above issues CDTEMS was formed in FYOO with Congressional 
support. This funding was conrinued in FYO 1. However, most of that funding was 
subject to approval by USJFCOM ]9 and therefore had to be directed at programs 
that supported the ]9 mission. In FY02 the funding came directly to NPS, permitting 
us to initiate innovative new programs in support of CDTEMS objectives. The above 
stared focus of CDTEMS is especially important after the events of 11 September. 
Since the private sector has surpassed DoD in their ability to rapidly develop and 
apply technology and since the DoD is no longer the primary developer of new 
technology, DoD must effectively leverage their S&T investments in critical areas to 
insure our continued superiority in military capabilities. It must also use new and 
innovative incentives and educational methods to encourage more young warfighters 
ro focus their education on science and engineering so that they can more effectively 
utilize these new technologies. Many of the new technologies are multi-disciplinary 
and require systems analyses. 
In FYO 1 CDTEMS funding for the NPS Program was utilized to support the 
formation of three new Institutes; the Cebrowski Institute for Information Innovation 
and Superiority (CI), the Modeling, Virtual Environments, and Simulation Institute 
(MOVES), and the Wayne E. Meyer Institute of Systems Engineering (MI). These 
education and research Institutes are highly interdisciplinary in approach and address 
many of the stated objectives of CDTEMS. The Cl is the center of innovative 
research and education in enabling information technologies, operations, and strate-
gies, with focus on their development and application for national security. Using 
NPS RESEARCH is published by the Office 
of the· Dean .ofResea:rchin accordance with 
NAVSO P-35. Views and opinions expressed are 
not necessarily those of the D epartment of rhe 
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--continued on page 2 
NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL 
RADM David.R. Ellison, USN,Super~tenden~ .•. 
Dr. Richard Elster, Provost + 
Dr. David W. Netter, Associate Provost and 
Dean ofResearch 
Danietle Knska, Editor, NPS Research 
February 2003 
IN THIS ISSUE 
Center for Defense Technology and 
Education for the Military Services 
The Nemesis Project: Concept of 
Operations ..... ....... ... .. ..... ...... .. .. ............ .... ... .. ... ... 3 
Network Management for Ubiquitous 
Surveillance Environment .. .................................. 6 
Integrated Asymmerric Goal O rganization (lAGO): 
A Multi-Agent Model of Conceptual Blending ...... S 
Integrated Project in Expeditionary Warf:'IIe 
Complete Major Milestone ...... .. .......... .. ...... .. .... 12 
Information Operations Summer Study ........ .. .... 15 
Monterey Summer Studv: U.S. Defense Policy 
Options for South Asia .......... ...................... ...... . 16 
Design, Performance and Analysis of Unmanned 
Aerial Vehicle Systems Short-Course .. .... ............. 16 
Strategic Insights ......................... .. .. .. ... ...... .. ...... . 17 
Demonsrration of Linked Unmanned Aerial Vehicle 
(UAV) Observations and Atmospheric Model 
Prediction in Chern/Bio Attack Response .. .......... 19 
Fleet Transit Program .. ................. ................... ... 22 
Laser Beacon Prototype .. .. .................................. 22 
Integrated Theater Assessment Profiling System .. 24 
Shipboard Integrated Tactical Team .. ............ .... ... 26 
Experimental Analysis of the Integration of 
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles and Naval Special 
Warf:'Ue Operations .. ...... .................................... 27 
Homeland Defense and Security: The 
Naval Postgraduate School 's 
Initiative 
Homeland Security Digital Library Project .. ........ 33 
Attacking and Defending Communications 
Networks .......................................... ...... .. ......... 34 
Face Recognition System Using Uncooled Infrared 
Imaging ... .. .. .... ... .. ........... . ... .. .... .. ...................... 36 
Analyzing Electric Power Grids Under Terrorist 
Threat .. .. ........ .. ........................ .... .... . .... .... .. .. .... 38 
Vulnerabili ty of Wireless Local Area Netwo rks to 
Intercep tion ............. ..... ............. .... .............. ....... 40 
Concealed Weapons Detection ........ ...... ...... . ..... .4 1 
lntelligem SofTware Decoys .... ........ .. ......... .... .. .... 42 
RESEARCH ExcELLENCE SusTAINS EDuCATION ADVANCES READINEss CHANGES HisTORY 
C D TE M S continued from page 1 
parmerships with industry and academe as appropriate, it also 
p rovides Information Professional education and innovative 
technologies for the warfighrer by conducting research in the 
areas of network infrastructure, fixed and mobile technolo-
gies, computer and network security, software systems and 
interfaces, strategic operations and applications, educational 
technologies , and policies and 
. . . " 
goal is to provide a computational model which can contrib-
ute to better anticipation of asymmetric threats such as te rror-
ist behavior. The MI year-long student project was a systems 
study of Expeditionary Warfare. CDTEMS also embarked on 
several additional new programs; a summer study to review all 
Information Operations (10) education that is currently 
available and to provide a pro-
management. The MOVES 
Institute is focused on research, 
application and education in 
modeling, virtual environ-
ments, and simulation. Its 
research focuses on 3D visual 
simulation, networked virtual 
environments, computer-gen-
erated autonomy, human per-
formance engineering, immer-
sive technologies, defense/ 
entertainment collaboration, 
and operational modeling. 
Since the private sector has surpassed DoD 
in their ability to rapidly develop and apply 
technology and since the DoD is no longer the 
primary developer of new technology, DoD must 
effectively leverage their S& T investments in 
critical areas to insure our continued superiority 
in military capabilities. It must also use new and 
innovative incentives and educational methods 
posed education program for 
Information Operations (10) in 
accordance with Defense Plan-
ning Guidance (DPG), another 
summer study which examined 
U .S. defense policy options for 
South Asia, development of 
a comprehensive short course 
which addressed a critical 
emerging area for the 
warfighrer-Unmanned Aerial 
Vehicles, augmentation of the 
CCC program to develop Stra-
tegic Insights which provide 
web-based, concise monthly 
The Ml provides unique grad-
uate education and research 
to encourage more young warfighters to focus 
their education on science and engineering so 
that they can more effect ively utilize hese new 
technologies. Many of the new technolog ies are 
multi-disciplinary and require sys ems analyses. 
to increase the knowledge and 
skills of military officers and the supporting civilian force in 
systems engineering, systems analysis, and large-scale experi-
mentation. In addition to applied research in these areas 
this Institute sponsors a campus-wide interdisciplinary sys-
tems engineering project that addresses force-level issues. In 
the past these studies have included the value of UAV aircraft 
carriers and small inshore combatants. Funding in FYO 1 
was also utilized to form a new Research Center, the Center 
for Contemporary Conflict (CCC), whose initial effort was 
an innovative new program to bring focused regional security 
education to deploying forces. 
In FY02 CDTEMS continued to support innovative 
programs within the three Institutes. The CI initiated a 
new project/capability called NEMESIS which will be a fully 
reconfigurable mobile computer network attack/defense and 
exploitation and research platform. As a part of this effort 
the Global Information Grid Applications (GIGA) Lab was 
enhanced to provide a network operating center and moddino 
and simulation support for the mobile van. In MOVES a 
new center was formed; the Center for the Study of Potencial 
Outcomes. Irs initial project focused on a multiagent modd 
of conceptual blending in which agent technology can create 
new knowledge based on its experience and processing. The 
analyses of regions and issues 
critical ro t: rurional security, an interdisciplinary program 
rhe utili~- of combining meteorological and 
lET C prediction capabilities with UAV 
en and flight control fo r rapid decision 
en Chern Bio agents are released, an inno-
in ;"hich faculty and students are 
th · r laresr cience and technology 
to the Aeer as it nansits off the 
en dlo hi program which per-
edge and experience wi th 
.rv...-r>rtftn:21 sn<)m:WS an work on solutions using 
on. and a limited objective field experi-
ae:mCJ~m;uare the utility for utilizing multiple, expend-
,th avy Special Forces (SEALs) for 
... u .... ,, .... ,, .. en o the downed-pilot-rescue mission. Each of 
oru ts discussed in this issue of the Research ewslet-
rer. 
C TE [ has provided a valuable new capability to 
• P . ~e now have the funding which gives us the Ac:x.ibili ty 
ro utilize the knowledge and skills of our unique j · nr and 
international students and of our facul ty ro in~·f""';no-2r 
rive new approaches for applying emergino 1e£n,._,_., 
educational methods to enhance warfigh ter eif'f1:rn't!'n~'> 
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THE NEMESIS PROJECT: CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS 
Introduction 
The Cebrowski Institute for Information Innovation and 
Superiority (CI) Network Warfare Van (NetWarVan) pro-
gram is called the "Nemesis Project. " The purpose of the 
Nemesis project is to create a fully re-configurable mobile 
computer network attack/defense and exploitation lab and 
research platform to ensure NPS's role as a dominant resource 
for years to come in the wireless Information Assurance 
space. Nemesis's initial configuration will be as a mobile 
802.11 wireless computer network vulnerability lab and 
research facility. The Nemesis deployment platform will be 
re-configurable to allow for research and development of 
solutions for vulnerability assessment for several other emerg-
ing wireless communication mediums such as cellular phone 
communication vulnerability research, fixed broadband wire-
less data vulnerability research, and other radio frequency 
(RF) vulnerabilities. A byproduct of this initiative will 
be to create and implement a Computer Network Vulne~­
ability Assessment 
Training portal via 
a secure website on 
the SIPRNET for 
USPACOM and 
other major DoD 
organizations. 
Background 
With the recent 
proliferation of 
wireless (802.11) 
networks in DoD 
and in the Federal 
Government, 
many of which are 
ad hoc wireless 
networks with 





security, comes a 
dramatic increase 
in the ability for 
adversaries to 
access our net-
J~!7 ce.~~R..vski.,. 1.~~!.itu~1 ·;n itiate~ f~ . ~e~~'f?rojectL 
' (5~pability' call ~tt NEMESIS whi<$f1' w'ill' be a li 
fully reconfigurable mobile computer network 
c:tttack/cl~fense and exploitatiOI'l ·.and .·. r~~earch 
· r;i~tfo fffi1> As /li ~l·rt>af11!1this 'e'ttah tlit llt;lobal 
Information Grid Applications (GIGA) Lab was 
enhanced to provide dat~ranalysi$ and modeling 
arid sini8latiofi':~tipportttitth~ ~'ffi6•bu~llflln. ::tr\'1% ' 
works without physical connections and without ever being 
detected. Wireless communications (such as cellular tele-
phones, cordless phones and wireless computer networks) are 
among some of the easiest of eavesdropping targets. Given 
the right conditions, motivations and resources, interception 
and exploitation of these wireless data transmission types are 
deadly "low hanging fruit" for adversaries. Cellular commu-
nications can be intercepted over hundreds of square miles 
while wireless can 
be intercepted sev-
eral miles away. In 
addition to being 
an espionage and 
information war-
fare windfall by 
professional adver-
. . . 
sanes, monnonng 
and exploitation of 
these transmissions 
has also become a 
favorite target of 
opportunistic hob-
byists. This new 
threat must be 
assessed. Methods 
for constant mon-
itoring of such 
wireless vulnerabil-
ities must be iden-
tified and then 
these vulnerabili-
ties must be rem-
edied. The Nem-
esis platform is a 
mobile lab that 
--continued on page 4 
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THE NEMESIS PROJECT: CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS, continuedftompage 3 
will be able to provide research, training and practical experi-
ence for identification of vulnerabilities whether on a military 
base, ship or squadron, Federal Government installation, or 
critical national infrastructure civilian organization facility. 
Adversaries can set up a permanent or long-term wireless 
attack capability in an apartment across the street from a 
base, ship or building completely undetected with only a few 
hundred dollars worth of hardware and software. Adversaries 
can "drive-by" or "fly-by" a base, ship or building and attack 
networks also without detection. The Nemesis platform will 
be equipped with hardware, software and antennas to identifY 
such vulnerabilities in support of Homeland Defense and the 
Global War on Terrorism. 
Scope 
The initial concept-of-operations for the Nemesis Project 
will: 
• Provide a requirements analysis, modeling, development 
and deployment of a fully re-configurable mobile computer 
network attack! defense and exploitation lab. This analysis has 
been completed. 
• C reate and implement a Computer Network Vulner-
ability Assessment Training Package via a secure website on 
the SIPRNET for USPACOM and other DoD organizations. 
• Implement a test bed for NPS students to become famil-
iar with emerging wireless technology vulnerabilities and 
adversary techniques in this area. 
• Provide real-world experience for NPS students and fac-
ulty to conduct network warfare operations to include com-
puter network attack/ defense and exploitation of DoD, local, 
state, and federal government computer networks. 
• Create experience opportunities for NPS students to gen-
erate vulnerability reports to include recommended actions 
by agencies that are found to be susceptible to such network 
attacks. 
• Participate in the NPS '03 Cebrowski Institute Sympo-
sium to showcase the mobile network warfare platform and 
identifY additional research projects/sponsors in this field of 
study. 
• Draft W ireless network policy and deployment guide-
lines. 
• Comment on DoD's draft wireless network policy doc-
trine. This task has been completed. 
• Provide a legal analysis and recommendations for legally 
conducting wireless network vulnerability assessm ents. (This 
task has been completed. ) 
The Initial implementation is for western United States, 
bur the NetWarVan could be transportable outside CONUS. 
In addition, a portable mobile equipment suite is planned 
for integration into the Nemesis Program in FY03 . 
The "Nemesis Project" team will successfully prove the 
utili ty of the mobile deployment platform within the virtual 
battlespace and will continue to provide a flexible, sustain-
able mobile capability to test new security applications or to 
identifY new securi ty vulnerabilities and weaknesses within 
DoD, intelligence and law enforcement communities in sup-
port of overall homeland defense. 
Conceptual Model 
Based on preliminary research on the ideal vehicle type, 
NPS is in the process of acquiring a Class 'fl.: Motor Coach, 
1995 model, 33 feet in length, with a 7 kW generator. The 
vehicle's back end will be converted into a lab and work area 
immediately, and will have front/rear air conditioning. Part 
of the vehicle's main area will be also converted to a work 
area. T he Nemesis team investigated other types of vehicle 
including step vans, conversion vans, and cargo vans. The 
team determined that the cost and time to convert such 
vehicles to our needs (wid1 a network warfare lab, living 
spaces, generators, air conditioners, etc.) would be unreason-
able. 
The initial Nemesis lab and communications center 
consists of six laptops, a basic network server, two equipment 
enclosures (racks), a color ink jet printer, a laser b/w printer, 
an Iridium satellite phone, a Voice Over IP (VOIP) phone, 
an uninterruptible power supply (UPS), a mobile auto-
tracking KVH 400 kbps broadband satellite Internet access 
system, a lightning arrestor, a KVA system (keyboard, mouse, 
monitor controller switch), multiple antennas for network 
attacks, one Yellowjacket IPAC PDA with antennas for hand-
carrying to some sites, five external 120 GB hard drives (to 
store large quantities of log files), several 80 2. 11 wireless 
PCMCIA cards, two special outdoor high performance bi-
directional antennas, antenna amplifiers and fum.irure fo r 
the network center. 
Conclusion 
Collaborative Research Opporruniri~ o- e . ·emesis plat-
form are to provide: 
• D evelopment of new 
and functionality in u 
nued on page 5 
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work Centric Warfare. 
• Operation of mobile state-of-the-art wireless local area 
network (WLAN) sub-nets in conjunction with the re-con-
figurable intrusion detection laboratory research (RIDLR) 
facility located on the Naval Postgraduate School campus. 
We envision the RIDLR lab to function as an autonomous 
test bed facility to test/configure Nemesis equipment. 
• Ability to function as a re-configurable networked 
Internet connected target or training platform for 
COMNAVNETWARCOM, FIWC, NIWA, USPACOM, 
SPAWAR, NSA, and other Blue/Red Teams. 
Operational research scenarios are planned as part of the 
CDTEMS Fleet Transit Program with the Commander Third 
Fleet and the Bremerton Naval Shipyard. NPS Nemesis 
students are also participating with the U.S. Pacific Com-
mand (USPACOM) Computer Network Vulnerability Team 
(CNVT) to conduct wired and wireless network vulnerability 
activities in the Pacific Area of Responsibility (AOR) , to . 
include work in 802.11 wireless vulnerability assessments. 
The USPACOM CNVT initiative enables NPS students to 
accompany USPACOM CNVT staff on actual missions so 
that NPS students can obtain thesis ideas, and to provide 
valuable up-to-date hands-on education and training and 
assist with application of various resources (hacker tools 
and techniques, etc.) to the CNVT groups ... and vice ver-
sa .. . for various types of computer network vulnerabilities. 
Involvement by these USPACOM-CNVT-NPS students in 
the Nemesis program will provide these students with valu-
able experience and training that will be beneficial for their 
CNVT endeavors. 
The Nemesis Project is interdisciplinary, novel, and useful. 
Nemesis crosses several disciplines ranging from information 
warfare, computer network vulnerability, computer network 
attack/ defense, information operations, electronic warfare, 
voice and data based telecommunications, Internet data com-
munications, mobile research and development, and several 
other disciplines. 
We are already collaborating on this initiative with Com-
mander Third Fleet (C3F) as well as HQ US Pacific Com-
mand (USPACOM). NIWA and FIWC have also expressed 
interest in this work. We envision much broader interest 
and support, as virtually every company, sh ip , squadron, 
shore command, and federal/ state government entity are sus-
ceptible to this new and rapidly developing field of study -
and threat. 
We recognize that NSA, the FBI and other state and fed-
eral agencies have been in the signals intelligence (SIGINT) 
and signals exploitation business for many years . However, 
the objectives of this initiative complemen t rather than com-
pete with such operations. 
NPS and the Cebrowski Institute encourage those who 
might be interested in collaborating with the Nemesis Team 
and/ or utilizing it capabilities to contact Brian Steclder at 
steckler@nos. navv. mil . 
~s...~ - {;)"-
NetWarVan Layout Diagram - Proposed Design/Layout by Maj Timothy D. Kornacki , USMC. 
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NETWORK MANAGEMENT FOR UBIQUITOUS SURVEILLANCE ENVIRONMENT 
LtCol D. Overton, United States Marine Corps 
LtCol C. Ahciarliu, Romanian Air Force 
Maj Brandon Johnson, United States Marine Corps 
Associate Professor Alex Bordetsky, Department of 
Information Science 
Introduction 
This project is a component of a larger body of research 
involving the Nemesis Van and thesis research in the area of 
Ubiquitous Surveillance. The objective is to develop a small 
bur architecturally representative testbed to demonstrate a 
limited set of capabilities inherent in a ubiquitous surveillance 
network, with a focus on the network management aspects 
of such. 
The testbed developed for this project provided some 
limited derails about network management which are reported 
in this paper. Much of the added value of this examination 
comes from the extrapolation of this information into the 
operational scenario , and particularly a more robust and 
expanded network. The discussions that follow, therefore, 
each have two components; the empirical findings that are 
limited to the experimental environment and the extrapolated 
assessments based on the expected or defined operating envi-
ronment and configuration for this system. 
Application and Network Operation Scenario 
While the definition of "ubiquitous surveillance" 
is open to some interpretation it is defined in 
this paper within the context of a scenario that 
limits irs scope to a particular notional architec-
ture. Additionally, it is conceived that a "ubiqui-
tous surveillance" network or system would be 
part of a DoD capability that is linkable to the 
Nemesis network operations center. 
Scenario/Notional Network Construct 
A ubiquitous surveillance system would be com-
prised of a network of multiple sensors that 
The CDTEMS Program provides support for the 
Global Information Grid Applications (GIGA) 
Lab. The !.~IGA Lab provides: 1) a network 
operatingtcenter for the NEMESIS Project which 
mirrors and complements the wireless network 
operations at the mobile site of the NEMESIS 
van; and;; 2) long-term network management 
data an~.lysis and modeling and simulation 
support for.Jnformation Operations. 
areas, feeding into a central m onitoring and/o r command 
environment (ubiquitous surveillance network operations 
center (NOC)). For the purposes of this project, the central 
monitoring or command node is envisioned as being col-
located on the Nemesis van. 
The majority of these sensors would be organizationally 
organic equipment as their interface, management, and integ-
ri ty would need to be guaranteed. This would not preclude 
the inclusion of potentially trusted second parry sensors as 
long as their status as such was known (e.g. tying in to allied 
forces camera network). A notional diagram of the diversity 
of sensors and their connections is shown in Figure 1. 
--continued on page 7 
are potentially of multiple types (e.g. chemical, 
biological, nuclear, seismic, radar, IR, electro-
optical, acoustic, etc.). These sensors are con-
nected to a node (notionally a computer, bur 
perhaps in the future a purpose built device) and 
collectively they monitor a particular, limited 
geographic area. In a deployed scenario, there 
would likely be multiple nodes (network ele-
ments), covering multiple limited geographic 
Figure 1. A notional diagram of the diversity of sensors and their 
connections. 
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Configuration of Managed Network 
The notional network defined in the scenario 
above reasonably demonstrates the diversiry 
of the physical configuration of a deployed 
l.JI)igt_t !i~ 'QJJ~ m§~~I"Ye. i ll~:~(;~.fi! ... TfJ~~I)~~ 
sensor network. Obviously, reproducing this 
in a lab environment with the limited time 
and resources available was not possible, nor 
necessarily desirable. 
The intent of this project was to lay the 
groundwork for further experimentation and 
research by modeling a small portion of the 
network architecture. It was determined that 
r~:N•WAN 
minimum requirements included a mobile 
(or potentially mobile) node, a real-time 
sensor feed, network management software 
(NMS), a fi'(ed node, and representative 
sensor application software. The actual com-
ponents and configuration of the testbed are 
listed below. 
r"" . ....,.. -- -- ,_. ~ ..:-./..,;,.. - - _.._ ~- - - -: 
I ··---~~-.~~~- ;. I .. ~~ ; 
i #""'i-~: i 
: 12 : 
f Or!~ lJhO'l'Wil <•l~ ~·4ft Figure 2. Ubiquitous 
Surveillance Testbed. 
t 'Ji:\~·=:~.=>.W «:>~:~ 
i' I . 
r ~Ji Cqd» Lilt/ "' ~"'""**'* ""'"" r 
,.,.,._, -- »*" """"·---,.,., """"--..,.,.. ,...,.,. --- *" 
Phvsical 
' 
• Fixed node: Dell Dimension 4500 desktop workstation 
- representing the server station connected to NPS network 
using a wireless card. Although it is a fixed piece of equip-
ment, in a larger scenario it would represent the mobile NOC 
of the Nemesis Van. 
• Mobile node: Dell Inspirion 4100 laptop- representing 
the mobile client. This simulates to a small degree the mobil-
iry and wireless factors of the nodes attached to the Nemesis 
Van. 
• Sensor: Logitech, Quickcarn Pro 4000, digital camera, 
(NTSC format) , USB connection. 
Software 
J 
• Network Management Software: Solarwinds Engineer's 
Edition (Hewlett Packard) . 
• Sensor Application Software: ID-2000 (!magis Technolo-
gies Inc. ) 
• Windows XP Professional (Microsoft) 
A model of the testbed is shown in Figure 2. 
Link: In the deployed ubiquitous surveillance scenario , 
the link layer (or layer 2 of the open systems interconnect 
(OSI) nwvork model) rakes on increased importance. This 
is primarily due to the heterogeneous mixture of network 
elements in the network, many of which are wirelessly con-
nected and therefore more susceptible to degradation due to 
environmentals or intentional interference. Heterogeneiry 
is a factor because not all sensors require the same perfor-
mance parameters, and therefore the network management 
software will need to use different management information 
base (MIB) variables and metrics to determine whether a 
particular link is operating correctly. Obviously, knowledge 
of link status is critical , as there will likely be a requirement 
to know when a particular sensor is unable to communicate 
effectively with the network because of a degraded link. 
It was intended to model a possible degraded link in the 
testbed environment by ensuring that the two primary nodes 
communicated with each other via wireless access points. 
This would offer the opportuniry to examine the effects on 
a degraded link as conditions changed (e.g. the laptop was 
carried down the hall) . 
Networking: Based on the platforms being used, and the 
network that they are connected to, the internet protocol (IP) 
is the primary layer 3 service employed by the testbed. There 
are other services riding on IP (TCP, SNMP, etc.) that are 
needed to enable the application being tested in this experi-
ment, as well as facilitate the NMS (SolarWinds). 
Apvlication: 
1l 
• Description ofiD-2000. ID-2000 allows the recording 
and matching of facial images. It uses a 3-dimensional 
deformable surface model that it fits to the subject being 
imaged by making deformations to fit the face. These defor-
mations are refined many times, closely matching the features 
of the face being imaged, and the results of the deformations 
--continued on page 45 
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INTEGRATED ASYMMETRIC GOAL ORGANIZATION (IAGO): A MULTI-AGENT MODEL OF 
CONCEPTUAL BLENDING 
Research Associate Curt Blais, The Modeling, Virtual 
Environments, and Simulation Institute 
Research Professor John Hiles, The Modeling, Virtual 
Environments, and Simulation Institute 
Professor Ted Lewis, Department of Computer Science 
Bruce Allen, Digital Consulting Service 
Neal Elzenga, Emergent Design 
Gary Ackerman, Monterey Institute of International Studies 
Background 
Thomas C. Schelling, in his forward to the definitive book 
about why we were surprised at Pearl Harbor, describes the 
inability of governments to anticipate effectively: 
The danger is not that we shall read the signals and indicators 
with too little skill; the danger is in a poverty of expectations 
- a routine obsession with a few dangers that may be familiar 
rather than likely. Alliance diplomacy, inter-service bargain-
ing, appropriate hearings and public discussion all seem to 
need to focus on a few vivid and oversimplified dangers. The 
planner should think in subtler and more variegated terms 
and allow for a wider range of contingencies. Bur the same 
people who need to think in extended ways are the ones who 
have the most to do during a crisis. This project explores 
the question of whether or not software, in the form of a 
computational model of cognitive behavior, can contribute to 
better anticipation of asymmetric threats . 
Current technical solutions that attempt to help in 
anticipation are usually based on rational choice models. In 
a rational choice model , the designer produces a set of alterna-
tives that may achieve some goal. Each of the alternatives 
is equipped with a utility function. The utility function 
produces a number that represents the Effective Utility of 
that option (i.e., the product of the probability that the 
alternative will work times the value or result if it does work). 
Rational choice models have two limitations that are particu-
larly important in connection with anticipating asymmetric 
conflict. The first limitation is that rational choice models 
assume the subjects will always be purely rational. The second 
limitation is actually more important; it involves the impor-
tant relationship between innovation and asymmetric conflict. 
In a rational choice model the alternatives have to be con-
structed along with their utility functions by a designer. The 
model designer's assumptions limit the options that the sub-
ject of the model can choose. Bur an asymmetric conflict 
the innovations of the subject are often the most important 
dimension of the analysis. As we will show later in this paper, 
......... ;.·~,:-:->:->"•'•'•"• 
:=< -- :.:::r::-:: 
In the MOVES Institute, a new center was formed 
--the Center for the Study of Potential Outcomes. 
Its i'1.iti~l r~.~oject focused on a rl)~ltiagent model 
t of contep~~al blendit;~Q;;inwhicfil'~gent technol-
ogy can 6'teate new .. knowledg~·. based on its 
experience and processing. The goal is to 
provide a compute1tional model which can 
contribute to better anticipation of asymmetric 
threats such as terrorist· behavior. 
the IAGO project proposes a model in which innovation is 
an intrinsic part of the behavior of the software model. The 
subject model constructs new options as it goes. That it 
is a key part of !AGO and an important distinction with 
traditional rational choice models. 
Our approach focuses on the cognitive foundation of 
the subject- what things mean to the subject. Clinical 
psychiatry tells us that the understanding of what things 
mean to the subject is the key to understanding the subject's 
behavior, the cognitive context of the subject's actions. It 
is clear from the clinical experience with individuals who are 
pre-disposed to violent activity that events have very different 
meaning to these subjects. In most cases, the person that we 
see committing the violent action perceives himself to be a 
victim and perceives that the target of the violence is at fault 
and in many cases is the cause of the problem. 
One of the key developments in cognitive psychology over 
the last decade has been a model that proposes mental spaces 
and conceptual blending as the mechanisms for conceptual 
integration or the construction of meaning. With the help 
of this model, it is possible to explain the process by which 
a subject constructs new knowledge and meaning from a 
stream of events. And that is precisely what we would like 
the software in our model do in order to help us with the 
anticipation of subject behavior. 
Our multi-agent work at Naval Postgraduate School has 
produced a number of new techniques over the las t three years 
that will help us to implement this conceptual blending and 
mental space model. We have defined Tickets to serve as 
packages that incorporate knowledge inside an agent. Con-
nectors coordinate the activities of multiple agents . We have 
extended the connector idea so that when two agents form a 
connection, the connection can become persistent, resulting 
--continued on page 9 
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in a scale-free network that is based on the coordinated behav-
ior of the agents. So we can use our agents to produce 
a "bottom-up" emerging behavior. Then, as the agents 
make connections and coordinate with each other, the result-
ing structure allows us to create very complicated emerging 
behavior. A project completed in 2002 demonstrated the 
large-scale use of tickets and connectors. 
In IAGO we combined these techniques to do conceptual 
blending with software. 
Research Objective 
The key assumption behind IAGO is that the context of 
meaning in a subject is the key to understanding and 
anticipating the subject's behavior. In other words, 
IAGO is interested in 
shifting the attention 
from the point of 
view of an observer 
to the perspective of 
the subject. Key 
events arrive as 
inputs to the subject, 
where a perceptual 
filter applies meaning 
to the events, which 
are then incorporated 
into the subject's 
Figure 1. 
Overview 




mental apparatus. By using a computational model of blend-
ing, IAGO will attempt to construct blended mental ~paces 
that represent new meaning or context of cognitive behavior. 
In this way, IAGO takes a bottom-up approach. The 
multi-agent system will continually adjust the relationships of 
mental spaces represented by agents to form structures that 
fit the context of the subject and, as the subject changes 
because of learning and actions, the structure of the multi-
agent system will also change. This may be the single most 
important advantage of the multi-agent approach to simula-
tion. The continuous goal-oriented adaptation of the system's 
structure-- when multi-agent systems modify their structure 
based on the goals and intent and the adaptation of the 
individual agents. Compared to other software systems, this 
connection between modification of structure and goal-ori-
entation is the key to understanding a multi-agent system. 
This goal orientation of the software creates the autonomous 
behavior of the agents, and it is the modification of the multi-
agent system structure based on goal orientation that allows 
and supports complex behavior. The complex behavior is 
represented by the modified structure. Continuous adjust-
ments to structure support the production of evolving com-
plex behavior and that allows us to explore the cognitive 
patterns in the subject. 
The motivation behind IAGO and the ultimate goal for 
the project is a blending multi-agent system driven by tagged 
input streams produced by subject-matter experts. The over-
view illustration ofiAGO explains our approach. 
The project subject matter expert has created a body of 
information that was known to the subject. This informa-
tion is tagged with type information and is time-stamped 
according to when the information reached the subject. A 
further refinement in our system allows us to limit the input 
conYerget"t':::e 
r>!!suhs 
information according to the certainty attached to it. For 
example, once this element of the system is implemented, 
we could limit a run to only information that was known 
to reach the subject as a certainty. Or we could do a run 
that combined very concrete input with some very reasonable 
inferences about input. Thus, the project would have a 
control over the degree of speculation that was involved in 
the input stream reaching the subject. In future implementa-
tion it would be possible to extend this concept and permit 
hypothetical events to be fed into the stream so that observers 
can watch the behavior of the subject model. As tagged 
information reaches the subject model, blenders combine the 
input mental spaces to form new blends. Our goal is to 
have these blends formed very fast and very smoothly and 
constructively. Cognitive psychologists point out that blend-
ing goes on continuously, it is very fast and that we are seldom 
aware of the blends that we're constructing. As blends are 
produced in the subject model, they return to the blender to 
--continued on page 10 
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receive further processing. 
As more and more of the interior of a blend are filled 
out with subsequent blending, the blended plan approaches 
a point where all of its pieces are in place. At this point, 
the blend is ready to actuate behavior. The completed blend 
moves to an output part of the agent where it is emitted 
into the comparator part of the test bin. The comparator cap-
tures the behavior and makes it possible to compare with 
the ground truth events that 
describe the subject's behavior 
based on the subject matter 
expert's research. 
The first step for 
IAGO was to produce an exam-
ple of software blending that 
uses hand tagged subject matter 
expert inputs based on research 
into the subject and to demon-
strate that the model outcomes, 
Figure 2. Subject Model (Com-
posite Cognitive Agent). 
S~:ifi S()I'y' 
g1$thvJ~Y 
although they may include a variety of paths, include the 
behavior that was revealed in the grotmd truth. 
In the blending model, we see mental spaces coming 
together and forming what the cognitive psychologist calls 
integration networks. 
In an integration network we have two input mental 
spaces. These form on either side of the blender. Associated 





inte.-.3mt ion ne~'IJrks, 
Blends: Integration Networks 
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with the two input mental spaces is the mental space called 
the generic space. It comes up from the bottom and attaches 
to the blender. The generic space contains type information, 
process information and techniques for projecting informa-
tion elements from the two inputs into the new blended space 
at the top. The blended space will contain information 
found in the two input spaces but also new information not 
present in either one of the input spaces. This can take the 
simple form of a combination not found in either one of the 
input spaces or more complicated forms that involve fusing or 
compression of information. When the blend is completed 
as determined by the generic space, the mental spaces leave 
the blender. But the connections that have held the mental 
spaces to the blender are converted into persistent links to 
form the new integration network with the blend at the top, 
the two input spaces and the generic space connected as a 
network. The new blend can return to a blender and be 
used in subsequent blends. Upon each return to a blender, 
new links are formed in the shape of a growing integration 
network. These networks satisfY the 
properties of a scale-free network in 
that the links are formed preferen-
# 1 blender \Va{t in<J .. .. . .. . .. ~
tially and incrementally. 
If we look at a closer view of 
blending, we will see that the frames 
of a mental space serve as a recipe 
for that type of mental space. For 
example, in our project we have an 
J 
attack plan that is one type of generic space. 
When we examine an attack plan, we can 
see the generalized concept - the concept of 
generalized components. So, an attack plan 
is made up of the following pieces: a target, 
a harm-agent, an exit route, an optional exit 
route, a trigger and a symbolic value. Each 
of the 40 to 50 types of generic spaces was 
constructed with the help of our subject-
matter expert, and each of 
, waiting 
them has this type of inter- l n put :Space 
lowing properties: cross-space mapping, partial projection 
from inputs, generic space, integration of events, and emer-
gent structure. Cross-spaced mapping means that informa-
tion elements in the two input spaces are connected because 
they involve the same type of information. Partial projection 
from the inputs is guided by the generic space. Not all of 
the information in the two inputs is going to make it into 
the blend. Selected information is pushed up to the blend. 
Different combinations are tried; feedback is used to decide 
where the blends are effective or not effective. Generic 
spaces contain the meta-data that guides the projection and 
compression operations that result in a new blend. Emergent 
structure is a key to the success of blends. The information 
found in input 1 or input 2 can be projected selectively, can 
be fused or compressed by the generic space. The result is 
that the information that ends up in the blend is not the same 
as the information in either of the inputs. Something new 
has emerged in the process of blending. The software blender 
itself is an agent-based device, an illustration that shows a 
--continued on page 18 
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w specified GS cype 
--,QF: ,_, 
s 
spedl1ed Input types 
nal structure highly gen-
eralized. These generic 
spaces are what guide the 
formation of new blends. 
_..., .. informiHiona! l?lements 
A!:--
The central features of 
blending include the fol-
..? or.g.ani:zir'g frame 
Figure 4. Blender Movie. 
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INTEGRATED PROJECT IN EXPEDITIONARY WARFARE COMPLETE MAJOR MILESTONE 
The Wayne E. Meyer Institute of Systems Engineering 
(Meyer Institute), one of three Institutes on campus, has as a 
major objective the identification of significant defense prob-
lems that could potentially benefit from an interdisciplinary 
search for solutions. In addition to its educational and 
research interests, the Institute actively seeks such important, 
broad problems, with a view toward assembling a project 
team of faculty and students who can employ Systems Engi-
neering methods to promote understanding of the problem 
and provide insights to decision makers. 
The Institute's first major campus integrated project of 
this type is a system of systems exploration of Expeditionary 
Warfare. Phase one of the planned two-year effort completed 
in December 2002, with follow on work to continue into 
2003. The Meyer Institute is guided by a Board of Advisors 
chaired by OPNAV N 7, the Deputy CNO for Warfare 
Requirements and Programs (VADM Dennis McGinn at the 
time of the project) who approve the tasking. The Director 
of the Expeditionary Warfare Division, OPNAV 75, acted 
as the project sponsor. The faculty leadership of the study 
was provided by the Meyer Institute, with Professor Charles 
Calvano, the Meyer Institute Technical Director, serving as 
the overall coordinator. A total of over 70 students and 
approximately 18 faculty members from numerous campus 
organizations participated (see Table 1). 
Officer students from the Systems Engineering and 
Ana.Jysis (SEA) program played the role of overall project 
Systems Engineers, while students in design projects courses 
in the Aeronautical Engineering program, the Total Ship 
Systems Engineering (TSSE) program, and others performed 
portions of the overall design task. 
Officer students enrolled in the SEA program are educated 
in how the Navy builds and operates large combat systems of 
systems. The primary objective is to prepare them to serve in 
operational billets by giving them the technological and ana-
lyrical understanding to fight today and in the future. The 
emphasis is on analysis and integration of complex warfare 
systems with compatible tactics. In addition, graduates with 
experience afloat are prepared to serve ashore as program 
managers and in technical/analytical billets on headquarters 
staffs. Systems engineering of a major project, as a team, is 
an integral part of their curriculum. 
The OPNAV tasking directed NPS to use a top down , 
system of systems approach to examine future Expeditionary 
Warfare operations in terms of current and emerging opera-
tional concepts. Of major interest was the emerging concept 
of Seabasing to support the Marine Corps' doctrine of Ship-
To-Objective-Maneuver (STOM). 
--continued on page 13 
NPS Research - SPECIAL EDITION page 12 February 2003 
INTEGRATED PROJECT IN EXPEDITIONARY WARFARE, continuedji-ompage 12 
The team decided to employ both 
a Top Down and Bottom Up approach. 
The Top Down approach examined cur-
rent and proposed operational concep~s 
such as STOM and Sea Basing. The SEA 
students performed a Functional Analysis 
of the Expeditionary Warfare mission 
using Functional Flow Block Diagrams 
and Integrated Definition Language nota-
tion to define the capabilities required 
to perform Expeditionary Warfare. In 
order to determine the capabilities 
actually expected to be available for 
Expeditionary Warfare, the Bottom Up 
approach examined the current and 
planned Navy and Marine Corps expedi-
tionary force architectures, referred to in F. 1 1 t t d p · t D · T 
h ki h 
" f d , 1gure . n egra e rojec es1gn earns. 
t e tas ng as t e programs o recor . 
The team identified capability gaps by comparing the capa-
bilities available and the capabilities required (Table 2) . 
Once these gaps had been defined and prioritized, they allo-
cated the most important of them to platform solutions. The 
ream generated conceptual design requirements for a family 
of ships capable of supporting STOM operations through a 
Sea Base; a long range, heavy lift aircraft; and a multi-tiered 
family of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) 
Table 2 ... CAPABILITY GAPS IDENTIFIED 
• Surface Platforms Capable of Forming and Sustaii~ing a 
Sea. Base 
• Shipboard Aircraft Capable of Transporting Large Loads 
Over Long'Distances 
• Ability to Rapidly Deliver Combat Force to Theater 
• Highly Survivable Air Transport Platforms to Sustain 
STOM Operations 
• Organic Capability to Collect ISR Data throughout Area 
of Operations 
• Ability to Support Marines Ashore with Both Precision 
and Volume Fires from the Sea Base 
• Ability to Provide Sufficient C4 Support to Fully Imple-
mentSTOM 
• Providing Force Protection for Surface Craft Transiting 
to Shore 
• Robust Organic Mine Countermeasures Capability 
systems to various supporting NPS design teams as shown 
previously in Figure 1. The ultimate result was a conceptual 
architecture; a mixture of planned and conceptual platforms 
designed to be capable of full y implementing the Ship to 
Objective Maneuver and Sea Basing doctrines. 
To compare the performance of the conceptual archi-
tecture against the current and planned architectures, the 
ream generated a large scale, high resolution dynamic model 
capable of tracking personnel, vehicle, and material Rows 
from CONUS through the Sea Base and on to the Objective 
at the level of the individual Marine, vehicle, and supply 
commodity. They compared the three architectures' abilities 
to project combat power ashore and determined the effects of 
weather, mine warfare, distance to the objective, and person-
nel and vehicle attrition on the ability to execute an expedi-
tionary operation. 
The metric used was Combat Power Ashore, which 
is the sum of Combat Power Indices assigned to individual 
Marines, combat vehicles, and artillery pieces placed at the 
objective. The fitness of each architecture was measured by 
the rime required to place combat power at the objective 
under the influence of the four previously mentioned factors. 
The analysis used t\vo measures of performance: the Time to 
Build Up Advanced Force (TAF), which represented the rime 
to insert one company of infantry and supporting equipment 
at the objective and Time to Build Up Desired Force Level 
(TBU), which represented the time required to place 80% 
--continued on page 14 
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of a Marine Expeditionary Warfare (MEB) sized Ground 
Combat Element and its supporting equipment at the objec-
tive. The sustainment measure of performance was the mean 
square error in days of supply at a particular location, which 
represented a deviation from a desired level of supply. Some 
of the major conclusions included: 
• The Time to Build Up the Advance Force (TAF) for each 
architecture was insensitive to the effects of weather, mines , 
and distance from the objective. 
• The proximity of the ships to the objective and weather 
conditions are the main influences on the Time to Build Up 
to the Desired Force Level (TBU). 
• Under good weather conditions, commencing the MEB 
assault from a greater distance at sea does not increase TBU 
significantly. 
• Improved aircraft combat survivabili ty (through threat 
suppression, use of escort aircraft and/ or more survivable 
aircraft designs) is critical for successful sustainment of the 
objective in STOM operations. 
• The Current Architecture, with the accompanying "Iron 
Mountain" of logistic support ashore, takes the longest time 
to build up forces ashore and is the most robust in sustaining 
the objective. The operational commander must be willing 
to accept the accompanying operational pause and the poten-
tial vulnerability of the "Iron Mountain. " 
• With Current and Planned Architectures, Sea Basing 
appears to be a viable operational concept, but only under 
good weather conditions. 
• Under all conditions, the Conceptual Architecture was 
able to project forces ashore in the shortest time, since its 
increased number ofMV-22 and conceptual long range, 
heavy lift air assets were better able to project forces up to the 
275 nm from the Sea Base required by doctrine. 
• The longer transport ranges and larger number of aircraft 
required make the supply of fuel a more critical concern. 
• While large numbers of aircraft are required to imple-
ment STOM and re-supply from a Sea Base over the long 
distances envisioned in the doctrine, there remains a need 
to retain an effective surface craft transport capabili ty to 
project high volume and weight loads, such as the MlAl 
tank, ashore. 
The N 7 tasking also requested the examination of 
several excursions; the most significant of which involved the 
effects of speed and the impact of High Speed Vehicle (HSV) 
platforms on Expeditionary Warfare. The team examined a 
Joint Venture class HSV as an alternative to a Fast Support 
Ship large bulk cargo ship and determined that at its cur-
rent cost, speed, and payload, the HSV was not an effective 
replacement for an FSS to resupply the Sea Base. The 
HSV, however, shows significant promise for other than 
logistics-resupply functions - such as force protection or 
mine warfare. 
The tasking also requested an analysis of the impact 
of reduced footprint ashore. The team's analysis showed 
the most significant factors in reducing footprint were the 
air transportability of supplies and increased reliability of 
eqUipment. 
This study was an academic exercise and irs results have 
not been endorsed by either the N avy or the Marine Corps. 
The scenarios used were created purely to facilitate our 
analysis and do not represent the official views or policy of 
the Navy, Marine Corps, or any government. 
Because of rime constraints, the study did not examine 
all of the capabili ty gaps identified. For example, the team 
did not conduct an analysis of the costs and benefits of, or 
the design of systems for, providing precision and volume 
fire support from the Sea Base. They also did not conduct 
a detailed examination of C4ISR systems and their require-
ments to support STOM nor did they conduct analysis 
of more detailed operational concepts such as "Sense 
and Respond Logistics" and "Enhanced Networked Sea 
Basing." 
The initial tasking, to examine Expeditionary Warfare 
in its entirety, was extremely challenging, since virtually 
any military activity can be relevant. It was obvious from 
the start that the teams could not cover all elements of 
Expeditionary Warfare in depth. D espite the need to cur-
tail some aspects of the inquiry, the study produced results 
useful to our sponsor and our methodology provides a 
jumping off point for additional paths of inquiry. 
A daylong series of presentations of the study results 
was given at NPS on 5 December, with approximately 100 
visitors from government and industry in attendance. Post-
presentation discussion sessions provided the opportunity 
for feedback and the exchange of ideas. Plans for the 
second phase of the study will be developed during the 
winter quarter (January-March) of 2003. 
The m aterials from the 5 December presentations 
and an executive summary of the study report are available 
online at www. nps. navy.mil/sea/exwar. The full report will 
be made available as requested. 
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INFORMATION OPERATIONS SUMMER STUDY 
Center on Terrorism and Irregular Warfare 
Associate Professor David Tucker, Director 
The Center on Terrorism and Irregular Warfare received 
CDTEMS funding in FY 02 to analyze requirements for 
education in Information Operations (10). This research 
was done for the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary 
of Defense for Resources and Plans and the Office of the 
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, 
Communications and Intelligence. 
The purpose of the research was to devise options 
for an expanded and integrated educational program in 
IO to support an IO career force. The research had 
three components: a requirements conference; a database 
of existing IO courses; and a research seminar at NPS. 
The critical task of the research was to assess the differ-
ence between what the DoD educational system currently 
offers and what it will need to offer in order to support a 
career IO force. The research accomplished this task by . 
comparing the database of current educational offerings 
with the requirements established at the conference. In 
addition, the research seminar looked at the fields cur-
rently identified as the components ofiO (computer net-
work operations, electronic warfare, psychological opera-
tions, deception and operational security) to see how they 
constitute an integrated activity called information opera-
tions. The seminar examined both the five components 
ofiO and the concept ofiO itself in order to make 
sure that the educational program in IO is integrated and 
comprehensive. Finally, based on questions raised du~ing 
the research, the researchers also addressed the relation-
ship between public affairs and psychological operations. 
The recommendations developed in this summer 
study form part of a decision briefing that the sponsors 
will present to the Secretary of Defense. 
Requirements Conference 
The requirements conference brought together represen-
tatives from OSD, the Joint Staff, the Services and those 
commands and agencies that will employ the officers in 
the new IO career field . The conference lasted two days 
and consisted of briefings and work on assigned topics 
in small groups. Conference participants heard a brief 
on Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) that 
explained the significance of educational skill require-
ments, how they are derived and the general characteris-
tics of the phases of JPME. 
''%%?'''' ''l\~~ 
In FY02, CDTEMS\embarked on several additional 
new programs, wgi~h i ?~luded .two ~'::lmgl~~ stu~ies 
and the develop'ment 'of a comprehensive short 
cours~ which addresse~\~ cri~ifal emergi~~ are~ .. for 
the wa'rfighter- Unmanned .A~rial Vehiclelt .··.·· 
With this briefing as preparation, the participants then heard a 
series of briefs by the Services, Joint and Service IO components, 
and the defense agencies. The briefs provided information on 
the IO skills that personnel need in order to function effectively 
in each organization. The briefs also described any educational 
shortfalls the organizations have noted. After the briefs on 
skill requirements and shortfalls, conference participants split into 
working groups. Each working group developed the educational 
skill requirements for a specific phase of JPME. The conference 
concluded with each working group briefing the plenary session 
on the educational skill requirements it has developed. 
The list of educational requirements developed at the confer-
ence has subsequently guided the development of the IO educa-
tion program by the OSD sponsors. 
10 Course Database 
Based on information provided by the Services and DoD agencies, 
NPS staff constructed a database of all IO courses offered in 
DoD. This was the first comprehensive listing of such courses . 
It allowed officials to have an accurate view of deficiencies that 
before had been known only anecdotally. Used in conjunction 
with the requirements derived from the conference, it has served as 
an important planning tool. 
The database will be posted online and updated. In addition, 
a version will be developed as a reference tool for use by those 
interested in taking IO courses. 
NPS Research Seminar 
The research seminar included four students, who took the class 
for credit, the principal investigator and a cast of other students 
and faculty that varied according to topic. The seminar brought 
tvvo nationally known figures in IO (Dorothy Denning and 
Martin Libicki) to NPS, as well as military officers who had 
directed IO on combatant command staffs and civilians who 
direct significant IO activities in DoD. The seminar also included 
presentations by several NPS faculty. In addition, the students in 
the seminar made presentations on research topics. Each of the 
students involved in the seminar decided to make these research 
--continued on page 16 
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MONTEREY SUMMER STUDY: U.S. DEFENSE POLICY OPTIONS FOR SOUTH ASIA 
Assistant Professor Peter Lavoy, Department of National Security Affairs 
Objective 
The aim of this project was to conduct preliminary education 
and research activities to prepare the ground for a possible 
FY03 NPS summer study on U.S. Defense Policy Options 
for India and Pakistan in the wake of the U.S.-led war on 
terrorism in Afghanistan. 
Accomplishments 
A plan for a future summer study was developed through 
discussions with: 1) U.S. policy makers (in OSD, Joint Staff, 
State Department, etc.) in Washington, DC; 2) U.S . country 
teams in U.S. embassies in India and Pakistan; and 3) Indian, 
Pakistan and American experts on South Asian security. 
Additionally, internationally recognized authors were com-
missioned to write policy papers on the following topics: 
• The role the United States should play in helping to 
resolve the Kashmir dispute. 
• Policy options to secure and safeguard the nuclear weap-
ons facilities and materials of 
• India and Pakistan. 
• Measures to promote deterrence stability between India 
and Pakistan. 
• Measures to counter terrorism in South Asia in the long 
term. 
• Options for the pace and scope of U.S . security coopera-
tion with India. 
• Options for the pace and scope of U.S. security coopera-
tion with Pakistan. 
DESIGN, PERFORMANCE AND ANALYSIS OF UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLE SYSTEMS 
SHORT-COURSE 
The Naval Postgraduate School will present the Design, Per-
formance and Analysis of Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Systems 
Short-Course 7- 11 April 2003. This course is intended for 
military officers and civilians who have a technical interest 
in the design of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) and 
Unmanned Combat Air Vehicles (UCAVs). This program is 
of special significance since it concentrates on the current 
missions and operations as well as Measurements and Signals 
Intelligence (MASINT), sustainability and force effectiveness. 
Also included are sessions on training ofUAV operators and 
the human factor issues of crew station design. Special empha-
sis is given to safety and reliability concerns. Vehicle design 
tradeoffs, design of the payloads and links, navigation, guid-
ance and control for weapons delivery, and the design of UAV 
antenna systems are also presented. A special plenary session 
will cover the evolution of the NATO Standardization Agree-
ment (STANAG) 4586, the standard interface of unmanned 
control systems for NATO UAV interoperability and the key 
to successful coalition operations in the future. 
This Short Course will provide an excellent 
opportunity for exchanging information on UAV and UCAV 
technology. A summary of the program is provided 
below. Registration information is available at http:/ I 
ocl.nps.navy.mil/ npsconferences/uav _short_ course/. 
• Introduction to Missions, Operations and Advanced 
Concept Technologies 
• Introduction to Measurement and Signatures Intelligence 
(MAS I NT) 
• UAV Sustainability, Force Effec-
tiveness 
• UAV System Safety and Reliability 
• The "Man" in Unmanned Systems 
• Vehicle Design 
• Payloads and Links 
• UAV design and Payload Tradeoffs 
• Antenna Systems for UAVs 
• Case Study in UAV Development: 
Global Hawk 
• Navigation, Guidance and Con-
trol ofUAVs for Weapons. 
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STRATEGIC INSIGHTS 
Center for Contemporary Conflict 
Assistant Professor Peter Lavoy, Director 
Strategic Insights (Sis) provide concise monthly analyses 
of regions and issues critical to U.S. national security. 
CDTEMS funded the Center for Contemporary Conflict 
to produce Sis for the Center for Contemporary Conflict 
and the Regional Security Education Program website. In 
FY02, extensive coverage of central concerns to U.S. national 
security, such as the War on Terrorism ( 19 Sis) and the 
conflict with Iraq (1 0 Sis) were provided. 
The list below shows the coverage that we provided for 
different regions and issue areas, from 1 March through 1 
October 2002. (Note that some Sis appear in more than one 
category.) 
Middle East 
• Odium of the Mesopotamia Entanglement 
• Deterrence and Preemption 
• China and the Iraq Question 
• Comparing Threats from Saddam and bin Laden 
• Deconstructing the U.S.-Saudi Partnership? 
• Where is Iran Headed? 
• Assessing Al Qaeda's WMD Capabilities 
• Nuclear Weapons, War with Iraq, and U.S. Security 
Strategy in the Middle East 
• Bush Enters the Middle East Fray 
• WMD Proliferation and Conventional Counterforce: The 
Case of Iraq 
• Shibboleth Slaying in a Post-Saddam Iraq 
• After Arafat 
• Will Saddan1 Seek to Extend His Presidency? 
• Iraq: Next Phase in the Campaign? 
• Iraq: The Weapons Inspection Conundrum 
• Will the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict Impede the War on 
Terrorism? 
• U.S. Security Architecture in the Gulf: Elements and 
Challenges 
• Current WMD Challenges in the Middle East 
South Asia 
• Problems in Using Trade to Counter Terrorism: The Case 
of Pakistan 
• A U.S. Strategy for Achieving Stability in Pakistan: 
Expanding Educational Opportunities 
• Assessing Al Qaeda's WMD Capabilities 
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• India and Pakistan at the Precipice: Two Views 
• The Role of Foreign Aid in the War on Terrorism 
• Rebuilding Afghanistan 
• Afghanistan Military Campaign Enters New Phase 
• Standoff Between India and Pakistan 
• Pakistan: Coming Out of Praetorian Shadows 
Russia and Eurasia 
• The Limits of Chinese-Russian Strategic Collaboration 
• The Role of Foreign Aid in the War on Terrorism 
• Enduring Freedom for Central Asia? 
• Russia's Military and Operation Enduring Freedom 
East Asia 
• China and the Iraq Question 
• The Limits of Chinese-Russian Strategic Collaboration 
• Constituting the Uyghur in U.S.-China Relations: The 
Geopolitics of Identity Formation in the War on 
Terrorism 
• China's Upcoming Leadership Changes and the PLA 
• Beijing and the American War on Terrorism 
• The War on Terrorism in Southeast Asia: Searching for 
Partners, Delimiting Targets 
Latin America 
• Civil-Military Relations in Venezuela after 11 April : 
Beyond Repair? 
• Financial and Political Crisis in Argentina: Walking a 
Wobbly Tightrope 
Europe 
• Kosovo: Time for the Hard Decisions 
Homeland Defense 
• Surprise and Intelligence Failure 
• The Economic Costs of 9/11 
• Intelligence and the Department of Homeland Security 
• NORTHCOM to Coordinate DoD Role in Homeland 
Defense 
• Homeland Defense: Ramping Up, But W hat's the Glide 
Path? 
--continued on page 18 
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STRATEGIC INSIGHTS, continued from page 11 
War on Terrorism 
• Deterrence and Preemption 
• Problems in Using Trade to Counter Terrorism: The Case 
of Pakistan 
• Comparing Threats from Saddam and bin Laden 
• Surprise and Intelligence Failure 
• The Geneva Conventions, POWs, and the War on 
Terrorism 
• Assessing Al Qaeda's WMD Capabilities 
• Constituting the Uyghur in U.S.-China Relations: The 
Geopolitics ofldentity Formation in the War on Terrorism 
• A U.S . Strategy for Achieving Stability in Pakistan: 
Expanding Educational Opportunities 
• "Illegal Combatants" and the Law of Armed Conflict 
• The Economic Costs of9/ll 
• The Role of Foreign Aid in the War on Terrorism 
• WMD Proliferation and Conventional Counterforce: The 
Case oflraq 
• Beijing and the American War on Terrorism 
• Iraq: Next Phase in the Campaign? 
• Enduring Freedom for Central Asia? 
• Will the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict Impede the War on 
Terrorism? 
• Current WMD Challenges in the Middle East 
• Russia's Military and Operation Enduring Freedom 
• T he War on Terrorism in Southeast Asia: Searching for 
Partners, Delimiting Targets 
WMD Proliferation and Counterproliferation 
• WMD Proliferation and Conventional Counterforce: The 
Case of Iraq 
• Negative Security Assurances and the Nuclear Posture 
Review 
• Iraq: The Weapons Inspection Conundrum 
• Current WMD Challenges in the Middle East 
Deterrence and Arms Control 
• Nuclear Weapons, War with Iraq, and U.S. Security 
Strategy in the Middle East 
• The New Nuclear Pact and the Post Cold-War Arms 
Agenda 
• Negative Security Assurances and the Nuclear Posture 
Review 
• A Quiet Revolution: The New Nuclear Triad 
Strategy 
• Deterrence and Preemption 
• Nuclear Weapons, War with Iraq, and U.S. Security 
Strategy in the Middle East 
• WMD Proliferation and Conventional Counterforce: 
The Case of Iraq 
• Anniversary: The Battle of Midway 
The traffic patterns that Strategic Insights websi te drew 
in FY02 indicate that these monthly analyses are raising 
awareness of the Naval Postgraduate School and its mission. 
Steady military and government traffic to the site indicates 
that Strategic Insights have served as a new and effective 
channel through which NPS can perform its traditional 
role of educating servicemen and officials about current and 
emerging security challenges. As evidenced by the signifi-
cant percentage of traffic that comes from the public at large 
by way of search engines, publication of Strategic Insights 
has enabled NPS to reach beyond its traditional audience of 
servicemen and officials, to play a valuable role in helping 
to educate American citizens about critical national security 
1ssues. 
INTEGRATED ASYMMETRIC GOAL ORGANIZATION, continuedfi'ompage 11 
sequence of steps inblending w~~~ as follows:,., .. 
First, we haveanavailable bl~gder. J:<ro menthl spaces 
are connected to the blender and the blender is waiting 
for fusr contact. Next we see an input space arriving at 
the blender. It connects with the blender and causes the 
blender to exte.q4 c,~J;necrors ar ..• ~n· p~nericsE~C,~ .. :tnd input 
rwo sides that will se't' up rhe bleEder for comb{ri~cio.n wirl1 
the right kinds of mental spaces. The next section shows 
generic space andinput space arriving and making connec-
cion with the blender. Now the blender has three l«'-·><L•"± tt 
spaces connected to it. Finally we see the.· generic space 
guiding the projection of informarion from the inputs into 
the new blend. After completion, the integrated nerwork 
of these four mental spaces, starting with the blend, the 
>~o input sr~S}? and .the g?.li:?ric space nqs>v~ off of the i (:}. 
·• .. blender leavmgit ready to resume blending: · The integrated ·•·· 
nerwork of mental spaces can also move back onto the 
--continued on page 47 
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DEMONSTRATION OF LINKED UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLE (UAV) OBSERVATIONS AND 
ATMOSPHERIC MODEL PREDICTION IN CHEM/810 ATTACK RESPONSE 
Professor Kenneth L. Davidson, Department of Meteorology 
Associate Professor Isaac Kaminer, Department of 
Aeronautics and Astronautics 
Research Assistant Professor Douglas Miller, Department of 
Meteorology 
National Research Council Research Associate Vladimir 
Dobrokhodov 
Background 
Chemical and biological (ChemBio) weapon attacks have 
posed a response concern for some time and have gained a 
renewed focus. The toxic cloud has to be measured and its 
dispersion predicted ro successful ly respond to attacks by such 
weapons. This is a report of an atmosphere model formula-
tion, UAV configuration/instrumentation and field measure-
ment effort ro demonstrate and validate a m ethod for the syn-
thesis of measurements and predictions to aid in the response 
to an attack by chemical and biological weapons. The even-
tual goal of the dem onstration/evaluation of integration of 
technology is to enable operational units to have a near-real 
time decision aid, integrated into a command and control net, 
ro assist them in responding in a focused way to a ChemBio 
attack. T his decision aid will be based on atmospheric model 
predictions of the agent transport and dispersion so that e./fic-
tive dispersion can be mapped upstrean1 to the source or 
downstream ro the region to be affected . 
T he multi-facto r problem led to a demonstration attempt 
to sort out real issues and to calibrate expectations. T he 
demonstration effort, addressing issues in ChemBio attack 
response, was of the transition of em erging as well as opera-
tional capabilities into seamless products based on: 
• High resolution models for prediction and assimilation of 
dynamic atmospheric processes; 
• O n-demand, near-continuous portable UAV sampling; 
• Capabilities in current rem ote (e.g. LIDAR) and in situ (e.g. 
tactical dropsonde) measurem ent of atmosphere; and 
• O pen-ended info rmation systems architecture. 
In addition ro the atmospheric m odeling/UAV sampling value 
and linkage, the dem onstration included in situ measurements 
for three evaluation/ design reasons: 
• Value of mesoscale models fo r plume history and fo r initial-
ization of condi tions. 
• Value added to prediction by operational real- time collec-
tion of profiles, e.g. by Tactical D ropsondes or LIDAR, by 
other assets. 
Another new initiative supporte 
i n:: ~Y02l:'was c;JJl i ~t~. t:di~g!plin~~y p~ggrari to 
demonstrate the utility ot comBining meteoro-
loQi.cal . ~nd o~~anog~aphi.~ !METOC) Pfediction 
capabilities with Unmannt:~· Aerili:tl Vehicle (UAV) 
sensor ~ea~1.1rem~nts af~ d fli .~ ht cgntrol for 
rapid d~tisiori makipg requ iredi ~hen·;;chemical 
and biological agents are released. 
• Value added by atmospheric sampling on UAV. 
Results from the demonstration will form the basis 
for future selection of several different types of models, data 
collection and model insertion procedures. One collection 
procedure is plume dimensions using UAV equipped with an 
appropriate sensor suite to m easure the dispersed agent in the 
atmosphere. The project drew on resources that currently 
exist and are being (or soon will be) applied separately to 
operational descriptions of mesoscale circulation and air-land-
sea interaction processes. Furthermore, the basic inform ation 
system design is open-ended, which will allow the incorpora-
tion of advances in real-time data collection, distribution and 
modeling. 
Approach 
T he approach and procedures were selected to culminate with 
the Intensive O peration Period (lOP) dem onstration designed 
to simulate a "roxie" plume by releasing a sm oker on the 
grounds of Camp Roberts (Fig. 1), fly a UAV for mapping 
the dispersing plume, and having supporting atmospheric 
observations for evaluating assumption~ and for ingesting into 
the atmospheric modeling parameter. 
Atmospheric Modeling and Measurement: Leading up to 
the October 2002 demonstration, a full physics mesoscale 
model was linked with the simple physics m odel (WOCSS) 
and pos t-processing code to create trajectories . The W O CSS 
m odel fo rms the operational basis for the prediction of th e 
origin and des tination of the tracer plume given the DAY-
mapped plume location and cross-wind structure. A dem on-
stration of the capabilities was completed over a period from 
2 Ocrober through 5 November 2002, with an lOP fro m 7 
to 11 November 2002. During the 2 O ctober through 
--continued on page 2 0 
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DEMONSTRATION OF LINKED UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLE OBSERVATIONS, continued.fi'om page 19 
5 November period, the 
model was run for a 
mesoscale region sur-
rounding Camp Rob-
erts, CA and in situ 
meteorological data col-
lection were made at 
McMillan Airfield on 
Camp Roberts. For 
demonstration purposes, 
all atmospheric model-
mg components were 
self-contained on a SGI 
multiprocessor UNIX 
compute server located 
at the Naval Postgradu-
ate School. 
Atmospheric Model-
ing: Because of the role 
of the atmosphere in the 
dispersion, an essential 
component in the dem-
onstration is the mea-
surement, analysis and 
prediction of its struc-
ture. The use of numer-
ical models to predict 
weather is widespread. 
The class of models Figure 1. McMillan Airfield, Camp Roberts, California. 
focusing on small-scale 
weather phenomena, known as mesoscale m odels, is com-
monly applied to plume dispersion. In a research mode, the 
m esoscale models have been run at horizontal grid spacing 
as small as 1 kilometer. In an operational setting, running 
models at such fine resolutions is impractical, since the com-
putation time required is often greater than the lead-time 
of the forecast. Also, many of the model physics schemes 
were developed at a time when grid spacing were much larger 
and, hence, many of the simplifYing approximations used in 
streamlining the code might not be applicable at fine resolu-
nons. 
Central to the methodology is a non-hydrostatic mesoscale 
model. The role of the mesoscale model is to transform infor-
mation from large scales in a dynamically consistent fashion 
down to scales that are resolvable by the finest model grid 
domain. What is first required for successful implementation 
of the m esoscale model is the large-scale view of the atmo-
sphere. A large-scale operational model was used as the first-
guess with provisions for corrections based on standard obser-
vations (e.g. National Weather Service surface and upper-air 
observations) and "special" observations (e.g. aircraft data, 
remotely piloted aircraft data) . How these various data sources 
are blended is important because, if they aren't combined in 
a way that the model '' likes," information provided by them 
will be lost as the model establishes its version of proper 
dynamic and thermodynan1ic balance. 
The Penn State/National Center for Atmospheric Research 
(NCAR) Mesoscale Model version 5 (MM5), which has been 
widely used for research programs sponsored by the Air Force, 
was incorporated into the demonstration scenario , generating 
quasi-operational forecasts twice daily at the finest horizontal 
--continued on page 21 
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DEMONSTRATION OF LINKED UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLE OBSERVATIONS, continued from page 19 
grid spacing of 9-12 kilometers. However, this model cannot 
be run on a field compatible laptop. Rather, output from 
these external location predictions were used to provide 4D 
data to the demonstrated field compatible trajectory model, 
Wind Over Constant Streamline Surfaces (WOCSS). Hence, 
the mesoscale model was linked both operationally and in 
research mode to a simple physics model (WOCSS) that has 
terrain elevation information at grid spacing of 100 meters. 
The overall linkage of models and measurement is shown in 
Figure 2. 
The WOCSS-adjusted wind fields were used to compute 
trajectories that can characterize the past and future three-
dimensional path of the toxic plume. The WOCSS horizontal 
grid scale is by no means limited to the 1-3 kilometer range 
in current use at NPS; rather, it is limited by the resolution 
of available terrain elevation information. A typical mesoscale 
model 36-h forecast requires 3-h actual wall clock time for 
completion which, when input to WOCSS requires 30 min-
utes to adjust the wind fields when model forecasts are output 
every three hours. 
The full physics mesoscale model forecasts were output 
every 15 minutes over a large forecast vo lume and are con-
verted into the format required by WOCSS to be defined 
for a smaller forecast demonstration location volume. One of 
the tested features was the WOCSS wind adjustment process. 
As the mesoscale model output frequency increases and the 
WOCSS horizontal grid scale decreases, the total WOCSS 
wind adjustment process increases beyond 30 minutes, depen-
dent on the exact specifications of the WOCSS forecast 
volume. The WOCSS-adjusted three-dimensional wind fields 
were used as input for a trajectory code capable of deriving 
backward and forward trajectories from a defined location 
in space and time. An archive of re-adjusted WOCSS wind 
fields was maintained as in situ observations were received and 
used to correct WOCSS fields. The difference between the re-
adjusted and original WOCSS wind fields serve as a basis for 
defining uncertainty in the predicted forward trajectories. 
Atmospheric Measurement: The atmospheric measurement 
and data assimilation approach was to compare time and 
spatial scales of predicted and actual atmospheric properties 
that influence dispersion. With such attention to fine-scale 
atmospheric details, it was necessary to evaluate the suitability 
of initial prediction and to correct prediction errors that 
--continued on page 49 
!\ n·p' ro· ":i ""~ """'l.l . ·~ . tA\,.U: J;4.tmost)heric ~-f.ndelin~ !" ~y 
/" ,::;,..,..o;.,_.:;;r·-:>·1"" J .Ll:u~s-s.;,.. ~t:w~:l!i: · ¥. 
/ .vperational 







~.c.- .. ~~-:.i .. """' ~Ll . .L'<,'iC:Sz~·~c;.;ae: u.t(hJC . 
at op E'rari otu t ee1t~·r (Th·iiV!3) 
36 -h forecast . ~ ···-· 
l . I 
/starHiard / 







"',.......-"V"'t!' I" • .~.... """"":" ' "' ,,.,..~ ' •· -~~· ' . '• 
// / Letj(t*f'!ltv t.2xv'2ilop tt:T aJ:lQ 1fous:ee Pt:t1HIDH:t±oM!i 
r=~-----'"'""l' .. ..-"' / /7 '\, . ·n.em :n•tnu.: <: um:1,.., . ·-
/>?.:"' . . f / ~Pwhrs ) - -~ ·~ 
I ..:::1:;. e ct a1 V'Z*.srlu l / ~"<:""'.-- !' · : J L acnd /i S ~:m il:et:_ . . ' l ,. .. ., "''t / ' -... ··-~' ~--"""' ""l / .obse.~:rvat:l . om: 1 / " .. 7.,._. .-r /·.,-~.....,.;:-'~.;... ·~·~·:l . , 
f ( . u· · -.. •~t / i • l . •, \, _ CO~tWtlCJJS : . 
,. ··•~?,g . ... •A y 1 l / ,. ~46-hr. &-.. '"-. • S<ta \,.,. til -.·  . . . ' . ,/ [ (--~~-:~ ::m .... :;:-
/ . \:;• r ..tteik~.~. ~'Jne:-,t ~-, - . 
·. . / "···"'=~~Jill [ e.ml~l;::ume 
IT : -· :+· .. «=f ; -·~·- ~ ; ::;:=· ... ~--:.::==n ?.u:_ 
Diagnostic v.rind 
Model on 1 ap to~ 
':voess 
·r . . ·raJector;-t 
·,· : .•• , :' o"'?: a]. 1 . !FI c~ cu. atl9n .. 
ort lap~®P i F··.·· .  orc.·.c· ...as···t · · !.>~u.rn.te ongin ..t ~ ... s..,."1d eittent ·vistHthzztri •'> .lt):n l a;p t\lp ·"" 
Atn1ospheric numerical n1odeling f1 ot,rcbart 
:Se.a ~ 
H1.ttnidity~_ 
J'>.g e t~t ~li:t · 
x:x:x:x 
Y.f'.tl 
NPS Research - SPECIAL EDITION page 21 February 2003 
FLEET TRANSIT PROGRAM 
As a part of CDTEMS we have initiated a 
program in coordination with VADM Bucchi, 
Commander Third Fleet. It is called the Fleet 
Transit Program. The idea is to take advantage 
of the fleet transits along the Monterey coastline. 
Faculty and students have the opportunity 
to test/experiment/demonstrate some of their 
latest S&T in an operational environment and 
the Fleet has the opportunity to experience/ 
experiment with these technologies with very 
small investment of time or resources. 
In FY02 we provided a 128 kbs over-the-hori-
zon SATCOM antenna system on our Center 
for Interdisciplinary Remotely Piloted Aircraft 
Studies (CIRPAS) Twin Otter. This will provide 
faculty and students the opportunity to put their 
experimental apparatus on the aircraft, control 
the experiment from a lab at NPS while the air-
craft flies out to interact with the ship offshore, 
and receive their data real-time. Multiple experi-
ments are possible on each flight. Flight time 
and experiment integration onto the aircraft are 
provided to the investigators so that some of the 
latest laboratory developed technologies can be 
readily demonstrated in an operational environ-
ment. Several facul ty and students have already 
expressed interest for the initial experiments 
in FY03. We are also coordinating with the 
Naval Research Laboratory (West) and the 
Fleet Numerical Meteorology and Oceanography 
Center for participation in this program. Each 
project requires considerable coordination with 
both C3F and the specific ships that will par-
ticipate in order to match Fleet schedules with 
technology availability and to insure that ship 
personnel can effectively utilize and evaluate the 
new technologies. 
LASER BEACON PROTOTYPE 
Capt Ed Hospodar, United States Air Force 
The objective of this project 
was to use portable Laser 
Beacon Prototype (LBP) to 
demonstrate enhancements to 
missile defense and other 
related technology. The U.S. 
government funded two dif-
ferent LBPs to provide in-
scene references to reduce the 
bias of sensors supporting mis-
sile defense activities. Sensor 
bias is a significant source of 
target location error. Both LBPs were tested in the field but have unre-
solved problems. One of the units did not point the laser beam correctly 
and was transferred to NPS. 
The goals of this project are to: 1) Make available a fully mission 
capable LBP at NPS for research, demonstration, and operational use; 
2) Demonstrate improved missile defense capability using operational 
DoD assets; and 3) Provide a Concept of Operations for deployment 
and employment of Laser Beacons for crisis areas. 
During CY02, Capt Hospodar was able to secure matching funds 
for his CDTEMS project and complete preliminary coordination with 
operational asset's. He discovered that the scope of the problem included 
a broken laser in addition to problems with pointing the projection 
optics. He teamed with Aerospace Corporation to determine the cause 
of the laser problem - a faulty crystal. He purchased and installed new 
crystals and aligned internal mirrors to bring output power of the laser 
to specifications. 
Capt Hospodar completed the installation of an astronomical dome 
housing on the Spanagel Hall roof and moved the laser up to the dome 
to begin work on the pointing system and calibration. Work is in 
progress to isolate the problems with the pointing system. Early data 
show that the pointing system may be more affected by random errors 
than bias errors. 
The project was originally scheduled to be completed in 12 months, 
however, unforeseen problems with the laser and difficulties with the 
undocumented computer code delayed work on the pointing system. 
Work to date has identified two risks: 
• The pointing system is a medium risk area. Preliminary azimuth 
and elevation data indicates the possibili ty that the pointing system has 
random errors that exceed the pointing specification. These errors are 
probably caused by corrosion in the bearings and are beyond the scope of 
this project to correct. An alternative strategy to correcting this problem 
--continued on page 23 
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LASER BEACON PROTOTYPE, continued from page 22 
would be to diverge the beam. This has 
the negative effect of reducing the output 
power. If this alternative is implemented, 
the spec could still be met. Additionally, 
the undocumented code that controls the 
system represents a previously unidentified 
risk to the project .It is unclear at this time 
whether rewriting the entire code would 
be more expedient than working with the 
existing code. 
• Planning, coordinating, and executing 
the demonstrations is a medium risk. Any 
time operational systems and organizations 
are involved there is some programmatic 
and schedule risk. This risk is mitigated by 
the use of Systems Program Office (SPO) 
contacts to facilitate operational interaction. 
The cost of mitigating this risk is included 
in the request for technical and research 
assistance and in the travel funds. 
More data must be taken to determine 
the true causes of pointing 
errors. Additional optics 
may need to be purchased 
to diverge the beam if the 
random errors are the largest 
source of problems in the 
pointing system. This 
represents a significant 
schedule risk. Also, the 
control laws, software, and 
hardware must be evaluated 
to determine if the tracking 
system is sufficient (once the 
instantaneous pointing 
problems are corrected). 
Laser Beacon Prototype 
(top). 
Astronomical Dome 
Housing on Spanagel Hall 
Roof (left). 
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INTEGRATED THEATER ASSESSMENT PROFILING SYSTEM 
Capt Michael P. Hadley, United State Marine Corps, 
Master of Science in Information Technology Management and Computer Science - September 2002 
LT James A. Wiest, United States Navy, Master of Science in Information Technology- September 2002 
Introduction 
The Integrated Theater Assessment Profiling System (iTAPS) 
was born of the stove-piped Theater Assessment Profiling 
System (TAPS) in use by the Second Fleet Staff. The system 
is a decision support system that is used to synthesize data 
ers (C4) Systems/Chieflnformation Officer) wrote an appli-
cation using currently available Microsoft Office components 
(Access, Excel and PowerPoint) to duplicate much of the func-
tionali ty of the contractor product. The problem was that 
--continued on page 25 
for the Commander, Second Fleet and his """'~~-~~,. 
,,,/',/·;Ov' "'c,h' 
staff to help them assess how operations in 
progress are performing. Basically, it uses 
data (grades and comments) input from the 
Second Fleet staff to create weighted grades 








l t~l: ..t 
l it'tA'iJ(I;\· 
The Paradigm f 
A tree-diagram model with parent and child · 
nodes is an appropriate way to describe \ 
iTAPS. Basically, there are areas of the oper- 1 
arion that are assigned and graded by per- \. I
. 
sonnel on the Second Fleet staff There can \ . 
be hundreds, if not thousands of areas to 
be graded. This fine granularity is synthe-
sized upwards into more general categories 
by weighting the grades as the Commander 
desires. The data is ultimately synthesized 
into a top-level display as seen in Figure 1. 
This display has categories which synthe-
size all the data "below" that tier in the 
system. In this way, an area that requires 
additional attention can be identified and 
drilled-down into by the Commander to 
get finer resolution. This helps the Com-
mander focus his limited resources quickly 
where his attention is most needed so he 
or she can make timely, correct decisions in 
time of conflict. 
History 
The format of using context-driven radar 
diagrams had actually been shopped by a 
contractor to Second Fleet but was too 
unwieldy and expensive to be of use. 
CAPT Oliver, the Second Fleet ]6 (Com-
mand, Control, Communication, Comput-
Figure 1. ITAPS top level display. 
time agot as you are alr~ady aware, we partnered with Microsoft and 
NPS to take our home-built Theater Assessment visual tool (TAPS) to die 
n t generation:}' This resulteq)n two profo~dthings, (1) we demonstrated 
igh o;dey ~~~~efits of .. t'partnersh,f~;~ithNfS .~.g.private indu~fry, 
~(2) weha:'if~[ product everagesth~ e~erging .n~t~echnologies ~ 
~aking our "picture" a product of numerous feeds and sources, regardless of 
the platform or system. Everyone is a winner in this sort of endeavor: pr~vate 
~g~stry gleans insight into the inner w~r~s and req~~;.~W"ents of the¥' 
~iggest customer, the Post Graduate . SchoolJ~~riculum ~qpnects directl 
'~ith the evolving fleet issues, and we get something tangible and beneficial 
that we can put to use right away. I am going to look for other 
opportunities to partner like this again as we embrace SP21. experimentation. 
The two stqdents produce~ a thesis as th~if capstone a~We~ement. 
~ummary is po~ted below, but. the full thesi§,is available ~~; http:/ I 
theses.nps.navy.mil/02sep_Hadley _Wiest. pel:£" 
. .. E-mail from VADM Cutler D awson, USN, CommaEder, Second Fleet 
NPS Research - SPECIAL EDITION page 24 February 2003 
I 
I 
INTEGRATED THEATER ASSESSMENT PROFILING SYSTEM, continued .from page 24 
this application was also stovepiped, un-networked and non-
dynamic. It also required significant man-hours to husband 
and maintain. CAPT Oliver was an NPS graduate so he 
took the initiative to contact the NPS Information Systems 
Program Officer to ask for thesis student support to make the 
program truly usable across their sizable network. 
T he Thesis 
A student team comprised of a Navy Lieutenant and a Marine 
Corps Captain, both Information Technology Management 
students took on the challenge. The goal of the project was 
simple: Can a web-based, easy-to-use version ofTAPS be 
made that eliminates the stovepiping while preserving all 
functionali ty? 
Fundamentally the task was one of eliminating the 
layers of the current system and utilizing the best web-tools at 
hand to give Second Fleet something that required minimal 
maintenance and upkeep. Since Second Fleet is standardized 
on Microsoft products it was deemed reasonable to utilize 
Microsoft products for maximum compatibility within the 
network. 
Data Layer 
The TAPS MS Access database model was deemed inadequate 
due to its limited functionality and scalability so a switch to 
SQL Server was made for the database. This required the 
thesis students to create a truly relational product that was 
not a part of the original TAPS. The relational model can 
be seen in Figure 2. 
--continued on page 26 
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SHIPBOARD INTEGRATED TACTICAL TEAM 
LTC Paul Mullin, USA, a recent U.S. Army Fellow in the Department of Defense Analysis, and LT Jon Bartee, USN, a recent 
graduate of the Combat Systems curriculum, published the front-page article, "Pur a SWAT Team on Every Ship: Intercepting 
Ships in the Gulf," in USN! Proceedings, December 2002 issue. The article proposed the tactical concept of a Shipboard 
Integrated Tactical Team (SITT) and was developed by LT Bartee and LTC Mullin working with an interdisciplinary team of 
Surface Warfare officers, Army Special Operations officers, Navy SEALs, and NPS faculty. 
The SITT concept combines two existing ship-board teams that currently conduct ship's self defense and Visit, Board, 
Search, and Seizure (VBSS) operations during Maritime Interdiction Operations. LTC Mullin and LT Bartee conducted 
a mission analysis review of these teams, highlighted capability shortfalls, conducted seminars with subject matter experts, 
wargamed, then prepared a new concept that included manning, training, and equipping a team to fill the potential dangerous 
functions of high-seas boardings, inspections, seizures, and ship's self defense. 
LT Bartee used CDTEMS resources to develop and present this concept, while participating in a Naval War College 
Maritime Interdiction war game sponsored by the CNO staff. The Navy is considering the SITT concept for implementation. 
INTEGRATED THEATER ASSESSMENT PROFILING SYSTEM, continuedfrompage25 
Application Layer 
Several products were considered for the application layer, 
including JAVA and Shockwave as well as others. The main 
problem with these products is that they require installation 
and maintenance of the software on hundreds of machines 
across the network . .. a significant burden to the Second 
Fleet IT personnel. Avoiding this 
type of burden was a sub-goal of 
the project. Fortunately, Microsoft 
has just released its .Net Frame-
work and it fit the needs of the 
project exactly. No client-side 
maintenance or updates beyond a 
browser (which Second Fleet was 
already maintaining) was required. 
Using this foundation, the web-
based portals for viewers, admin-
istrators and graders took shape. 
Since SQL Server was used there 
were seamless links between the 
LT James A. Wiest, 
USN 
data and application layers. Stan-
dardizing on a Microsoft solution also enabled integrated 
authentication using NT user permissions and accounts 
already in place at Second Fleet, eliminating the need for 
a separate iTAPS database of users to be created and main-
tained. The Second Fleet IT department could simply add 
a user to the group with the appropriate access and SQL 
Server and the .Net application would validate based on 
those credentials. This was a significant "work smarter not 
harder" aspect of going with a Microsoft solution. 
The presentation layer was 
Internet Explorer 5.5+; something 
that Second Fleet already had in use 
across its Windows network. 
Implementation 
Fundamentally, the project was 
coded· by two DoN officers in 
about three months time using 
strict criteria established with 
Second Fleet: 1) No new features 
required; 2) Minimize software 
maintenance requirements; and 3) 
Duplicate existing functionality 
100%. 
Capt Michael P. 
Hadley, USMC 
These goals were met. In addition, more features were 
added by the programmers to make the program more user 
friendly and expansion ready. The software was installed 
and made operational in a single day. Second Fleet strongly 
desires that this software be updated and maintained by 
subsequent thesis students. 
This thesis project is an example of how NPS can 
directly serve the fleet and demonstrate how relevant NPS is 
to current fleet needs. It normally takes long lead times and 
requires significant funds to implement a project like this 
in DoD and NPS provided this service within an 8-month 
timeframe with minimal funds. This project was specifically 
mentioned in a congratulatory letter sent by Commander, 
Second Fleet to the Superintendent of Naval Postgraduate 
School. 
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EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS OF THE INTEGRATION OF UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES AND 
NAVAL SPECIAL WARFARE OPERATIONS 
LT Joseph Clayton Butner IV, United States Navy 
Master of Science in Defense Analysis - December 2002 
A broad military use ofUnmannedAerial Vehicles (UAVs) 
has emerged over time with the evolving increase in UAV 
capabilities (UAV Roadmap 2025, 2001 ). The usefulness of 
UAVs is evident by their successful use in the War on Terror 
in Afghanistan, or as seen by the recent Predator missile attack 
in Yemen on an al-Qaeda terrorist, Ali Aqed Sinan al-Harthi, 
also known as Abu Ali, (USA Today, 05 Nov 02). However, 
these high profile missions also demonstrate a limitation. 
Predator, Global Hawk, and other UAVs like them are limited 
in number and expensive, and therefore are considered strate-
gic assets. In fact, according to the Joint Special Operations 
Air Component Commander (JSOACC) during operation 
Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan, Col J. Tyner, USAF, it was 
easier for special operations forces to get support from B52s 
to drop bombs than it was for those same forces to get UAV 
support to "see what was over the next hill" (Tyner, 2002) . 
A study of how Special Operations Forces (SO F) should best 
use UAVs determined: 
Control ofSOF UAVs should go to those best able to 
utilize them with the general goal to push them as far 
down in the chain of command as makes sense. In other 
words, commanders should seek to empower small units 
without unnecessarily burdening them. Uames, p. xiv) 
We wanted to investigate whether or not small, 
inexpensive/expendable, long endurance, UAVs may signifi-
cantly increase the combat effectiveness of Navy Special War-
fare (NSW) forces. They should be small to be stealthy, trans-
portable, easy to launch , and low cost. They need to be 
long endurance so that they can be launched before SOF 
insertion and remain on site until after mission completion, 
with minimal or no aircraft/payload control required of rhe 
forward forces . They need to be low cost for obvious reasons, 
bur primarily so that that they can be launched and left; 
eliminating the need for recovery and the logistics required 
for reusable assets. To accomplish this objective a small field 
experiment was planned and executed in which modeling 
and simulation was used to help select the test environment 
and variables, ro determine rhe most desirable UAV flight pat-
terns, and to develop quantitative measures of effectiveness 
(MOEs). 
Based upon rhe investigator's personal knowledge and 
experience with current SOF missions and operating pro-
In ~~~2, CDTEMS'supported a l imited objective 
fiel~y eXJ?~rim~nt to demonstrat~: .. the, utili~y f,gr 
utilizing multiple, expendable, smalt, Unm~mn~i:f 
;;;Aerial Vehicle's (UAVs) with Navy:)Spec:;jal Warfa~.~ 
Forces (NSW) for enhancement of the downed-
pilot-rescue mission. ' 
cedures, it was decided to focus this initial experiment on 
downed-pilot rescue; a mission for which the UAVs have 
potential for significantly improving concepts of operations. 
To develop interest and participation and to obtain recom-
mendations for conducting the LOE a number of facilities 
and commands were visited; Commander Third Fleet, Naval 
Special Warfare Command, Naval Special Warfare Develop-
ment Group, N aval Special Warfare Group 2, Office of Force 
Transformation, Office of Naval Research, Center for Naval 
Analysis, Naval Surface Warfare Center Carderock Division, 
the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL), and 
the Schafer Corporation in coordination with DARPA. 
In order to complete rhis investigation, the cooperation 
and help of many people and organizations both within 
NPS and external was required. The NPS Center for 
D efense Technology and Education for the Military Services 
(CDTEMS) provided financial support and coordination. 
The Director of the NPS Wayne E. Meyer Institute of Sys-
tems Engineering provided assistance with rhe experimenta-
tion, plans for data collection and analysis, etc. Students in 
the Models of Conflict course (S044 1 0) developed models 
for the experiment variables and MOEs. This helped deter-
mine the feasibility of rhe experiment by analyzing the force 
(red and blue) distributions within the search areas and the 
probability of the forces detecting each other. An example of 
the results is shown in Figure 1. 
Students in the Systems Engineering and Integration 
curriculum Naval Tactical Analysis class (OS3680) developed 
models which provided the optimum flight patterns for 
both the pilot-search and command-and-control (C2) UAVs. 
These models were based upon the requirements for having a 
one-km diameter of situational awareness. This one kilometer 
diam eter is an estimate of the distance required for a SEAL 
patrol to react to the ability of an enemy force to detect a 
moving SEAL patrol (or pilot) without sensors in a variety of 
terrain (and have enough warning to evade detection). The 
--continued on page 28 
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ClJTEMS 
INTEGRATION OF UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES AND NAVAL SPECIAL WARFARE 
OPERATIONS, continuedfi'om page 27 
models also had to rake 
into account the speed 
and turning radius of 
the UAV and the field 
of view of the low-light 
camera. An example 
of the results for the 
C2 UAV is shown in 
Figure 2. 
Cpt Alistair Dickie 
(Australian Army) had 
previously conducted 
thesis research and 
developed an agent-
based simulation to 
demonstrate the pos-
sible swarming char-
acteristics of UAV s, 
called MARSS (Multi-
Agent Robotic Swarm 
Simulation). He mod-
ified his model to 
examine a simplified 
version of our experi-
ment. It showed rhar 
the intelligence pro-
vided to the red team 
had to be increased 
(smaller search area) 
if the base experiment 
without UAVs was not 
--continued on page 29 
Figure 1 (above 
right) . Cumulative 
probability of detec-
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INTEGRATION OF UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES AND NAVAL SPECIAL WARFARE 
OPERATIONS, continued from page 28 
to result in the blue team having a nearly 100% success 
rate in locating the downed-pilot before the red team. The 
experiment plan was modified accordingly. 
The UAVs were provided by Advanced Ceramics Research 
(ACR) , Tucson, AZ. The SWARM vehicle was initially 
desired for utilization but at its current state of development it 
did not have the desired endurance, level of night vision, nor 
the image resolution at flight speed. Thus, a commercially 
available UAV (standard high wing trainer) was utilized using 
ACR avionics and controls. It had an approximately two-
hour endurance and a low-light (0.0003 LUX CCD) camera 
as payload. Figure 3 shows the SWARM being catapult 
launched at the NPS Center for Interdisciplinary Remotely 
Piloted Aircraft Studies (CIRPAS) UAV test facility, Camp 
Roberts, CA. Also shown on the ground is the Standard 
Trainer UAV IR strobes were placed on all forces to permit 
the available camera to detect them while flying as high. as 
4000' AGL. 
Airfield coordination and use was provided by CIRPAS. 
The Blue Force and C2 element members were provided by 
seven Navy SEALs from the Naval Coastal Systems Station, 
Panama City, FL and the Defense Language Institute (DLI), 
Monterey, CA. Ten enlisted Navy students at DLI provided 




While SEAL patrols normally consist of a minimum of 
eight personnel, depending on the mission, two were consid-
ered to be adequate for purposes of this experiment. The 
additional SEALs in a patrol provide extra fire power and 
mission essential skills, but the standard operating procedures 
(SOPs) for two SEALs on patrol are basically the same as 
for eight. The footprint, or signature of their presence is 
reduced, but this should have minimal effects on the data 
to be analyzed. Additionally, a limited number of red force 
and blue force personnel were available. The use of two blue 
force personnel per search element meant that the red force 
element, made up of four personnel , would be double the size 
of the blue force . A red force double the size of the blue force 
was used in all modeling and simulation. 
The experiment was designed to consist of a total of ten 
Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR) missions conducted at 
Camp Roberts, CA. There were two SEAL search teams, each 
with two personnel. The remaining SEALs were part of the 
Command and Control (C2) element, one C2 element with 
one SEAL and one C2 element with two SEALs. A two by 
four-kilometer op area was chosen to allow for the maximum 
amount of data points to be collected while still being able to 
conduct the mission within a single cycle of darkness. Five 
--contii'lUed on page 3 0 
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INTEGRATION OF UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES AND NAVAL SPECIAL WARFARE 
OPERATIONS, continuedfi'om page 29 
of these op areas were then chosen for their varying terrain 
and to ensure that participants were not operating in familiar 
territory. Personnel locations were to be changed in each op 
area to prevent any bias from a previous night's mission. Each 
op area was to host two separate teams conducting the same 
mission on different nights. However, one team would be 
assisted by two tactical UAVs and one team would not. The 
op areas were to be used in a random order and the NSW 
search teams would not know what op area they would be 
inserted into until the night of the operation, nor would they 
know if they were to be assisted by UAVs until that night. 
This was to ensure teams could not help one another plan for 
that night's mission. The scenario within one particular op 
area was exactly the same for each team except for the UAVs. 
All participants in a given op area were inserted in the exact 
same location as the other group that had utilized that op area 
the night before. The insertion locations of the participants 
relative to each other varied with each op area. Nightly 
missions were to continue for a total of five nights, until 
both teams conducted all the same scenarios one time. This, 
however, was not accomplished, and only two separate nights 
of missions were conducted (discussed below) . Each mission 
scenario varied only by location of crash sight, pilot, red cell, 
NSW team insertion point, and the geographical and terrain 
differences among the op areas. Distances between forces 
were nearly identical. This would allow for direct comparison 
of missions conducted in the same op area and a general 
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comparison of missions conducted in other op areas. 
Experiment observers were to track actual movements 
conducted by all participants to verify actual C2 and ground 
force situational awareness. A number of different recording 
methods were available to help track movements and gather 
data, such as UAV over-Bight recording tactical UAV move-
ment, voice recording, manual note taking, and GPS way-
point tracking. For each experiment the number of Blue 
Force detections of Red Forces, the time-to-link between Blue 
Forces and pilot, whether or not there was a positive link 
made, and the number of detections by Red Force of Blue 
Force or pilot were recorded. Questionnaires were also uti-
lized to obtain qualitative data from all participants after each 
experiment. 
While most of the initially selected operational areas 
were utilized, the UAVs were unable to By outside of visual 
range from the McMillan Assault Strip at Camp RobertS due 
to liability insurance issues for autonomous Bight which were 
thought to have been resolved (a lesson learned regarding 
detailed planning requirements) . This, of course, negatively 
impacted the design of the experiment. In addition, severe 
weather resulted in cancellation of the last two nights of 
operation. In addition, limited-line-of sight Bights were con-
ducted to test equipment and the user interface, and second-
ary autonomous Bights were conducted during 4-6 December 
02 in a new location (Tucson, AZ). While a direct correlation 
between the missions with the UAV and those without could 
no longer be made, enough data was gath-
ered to make strong inferences of effects on 
the identified MOEs. 
The primary MOE utilized was sit-
uational awareness. Figure 4 shows one 
example of the paths taken by red and blue 
forces and the pilot without UAVs in a 
night experiment. Each mark represents 
the actual GPS location which was taken 
every ten minutes by the ground forces. 
These locations were to have been com-
pared to a second group of forces utilizing 
a UAV The closest proximity of red 
forces and blue forces or blue forces and 
the downed pilot could then be compared 
for missions with and without the use of 
Figure 4. Red and Blue Force Tracks without UAVs Conducting Downed- UAVs. Situational awareness was measured 
Pilot Rescue. --continued on page 3 1 
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OPERATIONS, continued from page 29 
by the difference between a force's actual (GPS) location and 
the C2 element's estimate of their location. Due to the 
fact that the UAVs were unable to fly the profiles originally 
anticipated, the quantitative data that could have been directly 
compared to the data without UAVs was unobtainable. 
Instead, data collected from separate Bights, without ground 
forces, and with IR strobes representing fixed force locations 
had to be interpreted. These outside-scenario flights were 
treated as a snapshot of the events that occurred during the 
original scenario that had moving troops on the ground. This 
allowed the data taken with the UAV to be compared to a 
single set of data taken from the experiment with ground 
forces but without UAVs. 
Mission# 2 (05NOV02), Alpha Forces 
Blue Force 
WP GPS Track C2 Estimate Differ- Differ-
E N E N ence E ence N 
1 7 561 8 560 -1 1 
2 7 561 6 565 1 -4 
3 7 566 7 570 0 -4 
4 7 570 11 573 -4 -3 
5 9 573 14 578 -5 -5 
6 11 577 12 575 -1 2 
7 13 577 19 576 -6 1 
8 13 577 23 579 -10 -2 
9 16 579 27 580 -11 -1 
10 20 580 31 583 -11 -3 
11 20 580 33 584 -13 -4 
12 20 580 24 579 -4 1 
13 23 581 27 580 -4 1 
14 26 582 31 583 -5 -1 
15 28 583 32 582 -4 1 
16 30 584 33 584 -3 0 
17 31 584 33 584 -2 0 
18 32 585 33 584 -1 1 
Cumulative SA difference 
Average SA difference 
Table 1. Situational Awareness Data 
Table 1 shows the Blue Force situational awareness (SA) 
data for the experiment shown in Figure 4. The two columns 
beneath "GPS track" contain the actual GPS location of the 
Blue force in six digit grid coordinates. For example, Wave 
Point (WP) 1 UTM grid location is 007561, WP 3 UTM 
grid location is 007566. There are many data points for a 
single force as the force was on the move, and the points 
started at the beginning of the mission and ended when the 
pilot was located. The red force and downed pilot positions 
were recorded in separate tables. The next two columns 
under "C2 estimate" contain the C2 element's best guess as to 
where the blue force was located. When the location matched 


























called back to the C2 element with a 
position update, which occurred only 
once an hour. The "difference" col-
umns present the difference in hun-
dreds of meters between the actual 
force location and the C2 element's 
estimate. The absolute value represents 
the SA difference between the actual 
force location and the C2's estimate. 
The SA differences are added at the 
bottom of the table and the average 
value is also given. The lower the 
number or difference the better. An SA 
difference of zero would indicate that 
the C2 element knew exactly where the 
blue force was located. The higher the 
number, the greater the error in estima-
tion or the poorer the SA. 
Four sorties ofUAV flights that 
lasted just under one hour each were 
A.own over the Tucson op area to locate 
the three separate forces (IR strobes). 
The C2 element (one Army SF MAJ) 
observed the video screen in the tactical 
operation center (TOC) next to the 
UAV pilot. When the C2 element 
observed a strobe, the UAV pilot was 
informed, and the UAV pilot provided 
a verbal location of the UAV in latitude 
and longitude (later convened to Uni-
versal Transverse Mercador (UTM) grid 
--continued on page 52 
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HOMELAND DEFENSE AND SECURITY: THE NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL'S INITIATIVE 
The Naval Postgraduate School has long supported the inter-
ests of the Department of Defense (DoD) and Department 
of Navy (DoN) by aligning upper division course content and 
faculty and student research. Since the events of 11 Septem-
ber 2001, NPS has begun a new initiative to strengthen 
NPS' ability to help meet a critical national security chal-
lenge. In response to the Secretary of Defense's designation 
of Homeland Security (HLS) as a top priority DoD 
mission, NPS is leveraging its unique 
program is to bring executive level education on HLS 
to Governors' staff. A typical seminar will last two days 
and be delivered to major regions of the United States. 
NPS expects to execute 8-10 seminars per year. 
• Executive Education for State Executives: These 
one-to-two week courses are aimed at senior executives 
and policymakers. The goal is to provide brief, bur 
intensive, education programs for existing senior leader-
ship in HLS. An additional 
capabilities to accomplish specialized 
graduate education and research Bu ilding on existing NPS academic 
goal is to build teamwork by enroll-
ing a broad range of participants 
and regional perspectives (multiple 
State and Federal agencies). This 
allows for comparative analysis 
req uirem en ts. 
Building on existing NPS academic 
expertise in the areas of critical infra-
structure protection (including infor-
mation systems and networks) , coun-
ter terrorism , civil military relations, 
operations research, command, control 
and communications, modeling and 
simulation, intelligence, and much 
more, NPS will utilize irs diverse 
enrollment to strengthen civil military 
and interagency teamwork. The NPS 
expertise in the areas of critical infra-
structure protection (including informa-
tion systems and networks) , counter 
terrorism, civil military relations, opera- of different approaches to HLS, 
strengthens cooperation across 
disparate Federal agencies, and 
enhances local/State/Federal under-
tions research , command, control and 
communications, modeling and simula-
tion, intelligence, and much more, NPS 
will utilize its diverse enrollment to 
strengthen civil military and interagency 
standing and cooperation. 
• Masters Degree Curriculum: A 
Master of Arts in Security Studies teamwork. 
homeland security initiative will by guided by the creation of 
a new discipline, research, and the development of a digital 
library. 
The Center for Homeland Security was formed in 2001 
under the direction of Associate Professor Paul Stockton, 
Department of National Security Affairs, and Professor Ted 
Lewis, Department of Computer Science. The Center is the 
focal point for coordination of the NPS homeland security 
initiative and in doing so has obtained support from the 
Department of Justice (Do]). 
The curriculum and research priorities derailed in an 
interagency agreement with Do] focus on opportunities to 
strengthen the U.S. capacity to deter, defeat and respond to 
threats to homeland security. Efforts will deal with civil-mili-
tary and interagency challenges of HLS planning and opera-
tions. The curriculum will include both technical and non-
technical curriculum components, i.e., protection of critical 
infrastructure, history, policy, etc. Modeling and simulation 
will be built into the heart of the curriculum. 
The NPS Homeland Security Program is structured for 
maximum effectiveness and efficiency. The key components 
are: 
• Mobile Education Tean1 Seminars: The goal of this 
with a specialization in HLS has 
been developed. It is the first Mas-
ters program in the U.S. with a focus on HLS. NPS 
has developed a hybrid approach for delivery for the 
18-month program intended for experienced, high-level 
public safety administrators. Students will complete 
two courses per quarter via distributed learning. These 
courses will consist of online scenario based exercises 
and research work support by the HLS e-library at 
NPS. Students will also spend two weeks in residence 
at NPS each quarter, one each at rhe beginning and 
end of each quarter. The resident modules will serve 
to launch the two-courses at the beginning of the 
quarter and allow students to complete and present 
their research findings at the conclusion of the quarter. 
Additionally, the NPS Masters program thesis require-
ment allows for a two-way payback to students sponsors 
by providing high-quality, low-cost research on topics 
of concern to sponsors and creating subject matter 
experts who can help lead future policy development 
and operational planning efforts . 
• Digital Library: The HLS e-library at NPS will sup-
port students during their program as well as after 
graduation. It will be an on-line resource for Do], the 
--continued on page 33 
NPS Research - SPECIAL EDITION page 32 February 2003 
HOMELAND SECURITY DIGITAL LIBRARY PROJECT 
Dr. Maxine Reneker, Principal Investigator 
Lillian Gassie, Senior Systems Librarian 
Greta Marlatt, Head, Information Services 
Lori Emadi, Technical Information Specialist 
Layne Williams, Administrative Librarian 
T he Dudley Knox Library is developing a digital library 
to support the research and curricula funded by 
the Department of Justice 
grant for Homeland Security 
and Homeland Defense. When 
completed, this digital reposi-
ro ry will provide 24/7 access 
The Library staff identified rhe need for the develop-
ment of this tool as a means of "preserving the current 
debate" over the issues involved in homeland security. 
Since no academic discipline exists to examine these iss ues 
or prepare personnel for homeland defense, the Library 
m 
will contain a very broad range 
of materials, both in subject and 
format. For example, project staff 
will be identifying and adding 
research studies, news features, 
white papers and case studies , 
bibliographies, tools [e.g. simu-
lations, software] , congressional 
materials, and stare and local 
plans. Formats may be multime-
dia , as well as digitized print. 
The development of 
to relevant information to 
researchers, scholars , practitio-
ners and decision-makers deal-
ing with homeland security. It 
will contain web-enabled doc-
uments, articles, government 
publications, state and munici-
pal planning documents, gray 
li terature, multimedia m ateri-
als and contact information of 
subject matter experts in the 
D 'Ud ley Knox Library 
Naval Postgraduate School 
the Homeland Security Digital 
Library is being undertaken in 
three phases . The first phase was 
developed as a proof of concept, 
various related fields. It will also provide tools and services 
to facilitate effective research and collaboration in the area 
of homeland security. 
HOMELAND DEFENSE AND SECURITY, 
continued fi·ompage 32 
Office of Homeland Security, and other local, State and 
Federal agencies. 
•'if> Research and Development: NPS openly solicited 
proposals from the NPS faculty. In 2002, 28 proposals 
were considered by an NPS committee appointed by 
the Dean of Research. Six projects were recommended 
and approved by the Award Committee and Do J. A 
second solicitation has just concluded and additional 
topics are being recommended to Do]. Research sup-
ported in 2002 focused on: !)Emergency Response 
for Cyber Infrastructure Management; 2) Infrared 
Face Recognition System, 3) Optimizing Electric Grid 
Design Under Assymetric Threat, 4) Vulnerability of 
Wireless Nenvorks, 5) Concealed Weapons Detection, 
and 6) Intelligent Software Decoys. 
containing a browse-able list of resources, a search engine, 
a web interface for submission of new resources, and 
selected news feeds. The Library staff also undertook pre-
liminary development of a taxonomy for rhe organization 
of the digital materials. This development included defin-
ing the scope of the taxonomy, examining the standards 
to be used in creating the records describing the content, 
the record format, and the metadata fields to describe 
the content. This alpha phase was completed in October, 
2002 . 
Additional funding was received in the fall, which 
enabled us to begin the development of Phase 2. This 
phase of the project includes a refinement of the taxonomy, 
a more robust website with a customizable user interface, 
an alerting service, user authentication to enable different 
levels of access to restricted data, and a knowledge discov-
ery tool. Phase 2 is expected to take approximately 15 
months to complete. 
Phase 3, if funding continues, will result in an authori-
tative thesaurus on homeland security, and a collection of 
comprehensive digital information supported with a real-
time virtual reference service, online collaboration among 
professionals, text mining and data visualization tools. 
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HOMELAND SECURITY 
ATTACKING AND DEFENDING COMMUNICATIONS NETWORKS 
Professor George Dinolt, Department of Computer Science 
Research Assistant Professor Kelly Cormican, Department of Operations Research 
In trod uction 
Defense of our nation's cyber-infrastrucrure is one of the 
important concerns in homeland security roday. This con-
cern is repeatedly expressed in newspaper headlines and 
technical articles, and is the focus of an entire division in 
the Department of Homeland Security. In a May 2002 
article in the Wall Street journal, former Director of Central 
Intelligence James Woolsey implores rhe nation's leadership 
and all Americans ro "rake charge of assessing and correct-
ing the vulnerabilities in all of our national networks. " Cer-
tainly, both motivation and application abound for research 
on the vulnerabilities of our nation's critical networks. It is 
in this serring that we set about applying proven operations 
research techniques for arrack and defense of networks 
ro rhe more specific arena of communications networks. 
Our approach uses mathematical-programming techniques 
ro determine rhe optimal locations for netv10rk attack over 
a range of arracker resources, and then uses these results ro 
suggest the best locations ro defend (harden) against such 
arracks. We th en confirm the prescribed solutions with 
simulation. 
Background 
Over the course of many years, researchers at rhe Naval 
Postgraduate School and elsewhere have developed many 
useful mathematical techniques for the optimal interdiction 
of different types of networks. The networks include gen-
eral road, transshipment and Bow networks, and applica-
tions include combating drug trafficking, destroying war-
time supply lines, and inhibiting networks used by terror-
ists. However, there has been little application ro com-
munications networks, where an interdiction can be direcdy 
interpreted as an arrack on such a network. Therefore, 
we focus the application of mathematical programming-
based network-interdiction techniques ro packer-switched 
networks that do nor possess a centralized routing design. 
For relevance, we consider an example network similar 
ro the evolving N avy-Marine Corps Intranet (NMCI), 
although the techniques are general enough to be used 
on other communications networks. We derive a reason-
ably accurate model of communications-network behavior, 
attack that model optimally, and then use these results ro 
determine where defenses should be placed. The accuracy 
of the results is verified through means of simulation. 
Model 
The model for communications network behavior and arrack 
is derived from models that have proven useful for optimal 
network-capacity expansion: They determine the locations at 
which new equipment (switches, cable, ere. ) should be placed 
to best satisfy future demand, subject ro budget limitations or 
other restrictions on that new equipment. In these models, 
data is taken on network loading over a range of conditions: 
time of day, day of week, peak loading periods, ere. Using 
this information, and forecasts of increased loading, it is 
possible to find rhe optimal locations to expand the network 
for the purpose of, for example, minimizing the amount 
of unserved demand for communications traffic. The most 
rigorous of these models uses stochastic programming with 
sampling due ro the large size of the resultant problem (e.g., 
"Network Planning with Random Demand," Sen et. al., 
Telecommunications Systems 3, 1994). 
Bur our situation is the opposite: We find the "optimal" 
locations to eliminate capacity. Our capacity-eliminating 
attacks may be interpreted as a physical-layer attacks that 
result in a shutdown of that portion of the network. (In 
comm9n network terminology, physical layer is a reference 
ro the actual phys ical components that carry each bit of 
information in the network. Physical-layer attacks may be 
contrasted with, for example, routing-layer attacks that could 
result in packets being delivered ro erroneous destinations.) 
An attack may come from any of several means, such as a 
bomb at a switching center, a backhoe cutting a fiber link, or 
even a cyber-attack that results in a shutdown. 
Sophisticated or organized arrackers may be able 
ro achieve coordinated, near-simultaneous an acks at several 
locations in the network. In a worst-case scenario for one, 
two, three, or more coordinated attacks, we use our model 
to determine the locations having greatest effect: Which net-
work components, no longer available, most significandy 
decrease the overall capability of the net\vo rk to transport 
communications traffic? From the network user's point of 
view, these components are those that are leading candidates 
for hardening, where we assume that hardening a component 
prevents it from being successfully attacked. In fact, it is 
possible ro use an extension ro our model to determine 
the optimal components for hardening subject ro a 
limited "defense budget. " In doing so, we answer this ques-
--continued on page 35 
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tion: Which network components, 
if hardened to prevent attack, most 
significantly decrease the effect of a 
worst-case attack? In other words, we 
are interdicting the attacker to pre-
vent the worst-case attacks. 
Example network with the optimal two-attack solution indicated. 
Our approach avoids one of the 
more vexing questions when dealing 
with terrorist-style attacks, that of 
objective. It is difficult to plan 
against an enemy if you do not know 
his goals. For example, we make 
no assumptions that the attacker is 
attempting to achieve m aximum psy-
chological effect, or is attempting to 
shutdown a particular portion of the 
network. Rather, we use a measure 
of effectiveness appropriate for the 
user of the network (amount of over-
all communication flow, possibly pri-
S:;n 
oritized by importance) and assume our enemy is capable of 
initiating a worst-case attack as it applies to overall communi-
cation flow. This approach inherently also credits the attacker 
with the ability to recognize hardening of the network, too. 
That is, the attacker wastes no resources in a futile attack 
against a hardened network component. Finally, there are no 
"time periods" for alternating attack and defense in our model 
that would suggest a game-theoretic approach. Both network 
attacker and defender operate with complete knowle~ge of 
the state of the network. We believe the resulting model is a 
conservative one for the network user, just as it should be. 
Case Study 
O ur example network has 43 nodes, which represent routers, 
.vitches, or points of origin and/or destination for communi-
cations traffic. Connectivity between nodes is achieved with 
-1 links with bandwidths ranging from 52Mbps to 2.4Gbps. 
, .et"'.rork traffic is modeled as requests for bandwidth between 
-o node pairs. Three scenarios, or "snapshots," of network 
ading are constructed, with a 50% probability assigned to 
e scenario with the highest overall traffic density, and 25% 
ch to the other two. Using a few high-interest scenarios 
·oids the computational complications of stochastic pro-
.. ID11Tling as "previously discussed; whether there is a substan-
loss in model fideli ty can later be checked via simulation. 
ible traffic routing is determined by generating up to ten 
"near-shortest" paths between node pairs, where the measure 
of "length" incorporates link bandwidth, node capacity, and 
propagation delay. (Congestion is not directly considered in 
this model, although work on a model that will is underway.) 
Once several feasible paths are found for each com-
municating node pair, the model attempts to minimize that 
maximum communication flow between all the node pairs as 
previously discussed. This is a bilevel programming problem, 
which we convert to a more standard mathematical program, 
a "mixed-integer program. " We repeatedly find a solution 
to this model while increasing the number of network compo-
nents that can be attacked, and results are then reviewed. We 
find that the network is split into two independent pieces after 
only two (worst-case) attacks, effectively stopping all com-
munications between the east and west coasts in our example 
network and dropping the overall network flow by half. After 
eight such attacks, the communications capability of our net-
work is negligible. 
In the next step, we harden the two sites that were attacked 
to split the network, making them invulnerable. The above 
attack process is repeated, and we find that we preserve up 
to 15% of the overall demand for communications. For this 
worst-case attack, we can now more objectively compare the 
cost of hardening these two network components to the cost 
of losing 15% of necessary communications. 
--continued on page 36 
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FACE RECOGNITION SYSTEM USING UNCOOLED INFRARED IMAGING 
LT Diogo C. Pereira, First Lieutenant, Brazilian Air Force 
Associate Professor Monique P. Fargues, Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering 
Associate Professor Gamani Karunasiri, Department of Physics 
This study investigated the design and implemenrarion of an 
infrared face recognition system using an uncooled infrared 
camera. Infrared imaging devices offer several advantages over 
visible imaging devices, the main one being they are robust to 
ambient illumination changes, as illustrated in Figure 1 which 
shows a thermal image taken under room light and complete 
darkness conditions. To dare, the idenrification of humans 
using infrared (IR) is carried our using high temperature 
resolution IR cameras, which are very expensive due to the 
required cryogenic cooling, making their use prohibitive on 
a large scale. Note that recenr technology advances have 
significantly improved the temperature resolution of relatively 
cheap uncooled IR versions to the point where ir becomes 
sensible to investigate their applications to rhe IR face recog-
nition field , which is the focus point of our study. 
In the initial phase of the srudy, an image acquisition 
sys tem was designed and built using an uncooled infrared 
camera and starred the database collection. Then rhe images 
were analyzed using two classic recognition algorithms: (a) 
principle componenr analysis (PCA), and (b) linear discrimi-
nant analysis (LOA) for our proof of 
concept study. Results show rhar the 
uncooled IR camera has sufficienr rem-
perature resolution to allow for discrim-
ination ben'Veen rhe subjects conrained 
in our experimenral database collected 
under conrrolled conditions. 
Image Acquisition Set-up 
The infrared radiation covers a wide 
--continued on page 37 
Figure 1. Thermal images taken 
under complete darkness (left) and 
under room light (right). 
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Simulation 
A simulation, using the commercially available software 
package QualNet; is used to produce descriptive results rhar 
can be compared to the prescriptive results of the math-
ematical programming model. Using several runs of the 
simulation, we select various sets of net\'Vork components 
for shutdown, focusing on those suggested for arrack by 
the optimization model. We find that the difference in 
residual (post-attack) communications flow between the 
simulation and the optimization model decreases rapidly 
as the number of attacks increase to about 3% after three 
attacks. After only one or two attacks, the difference is 
15% to 20% of total desired communications flow. We 
conjecture that congestion in the residual network has a 
greater effecr w1der these conditions, which is why we are 
currently developing a model that incorporates congestion 
effects. 
Conclusions 
From this research, we see rhat prescriptive modeling using 
mathematical programming can be used in tandem with 
simulation to determine optimal physical-layer attack and 
defense points in a communications network. The tech-
niques used here are most appropriate for larger networks 
wicl1 known topology and traffic patterns, where routing 
is based on shortest-path principles. With further develop-
ment, this technique may be another useful tool for finding 
and addressing vulnerabilities in our cyber-infrastructure. 
NPS Research - SPECIAL EDITION page 36 February 2003 
FACE RECOGNITION SYSTEM USING UNCOOLED INFRARED IMAGING, continuedfrompage36 
range of wavelengths from 0. 7 to 1,000 _m 
m the electromagnetic spectrum. The heated 
objects emit infrared radiation with peak 
Figure 2. Image acquisition set-up. 
wavelength dependent on its temperature. 
T he average human body temperature is 
about 3 10 K and emits primarily in the 
8-13 _m wavelength band. This constraint 
resulted in the selection of the IR-160 
W1Cooled IR camera from Infrared Solutions, 
Inc. , which is sensitive to wavelengths in 8 
to 14 _ m. The camera uses a 160 EMBED 
Equation.DSMT4 120 pixel microbolom-
erers array to capture images at 30 frames 
per second that can be displayed on a video 
monitor and/or transmitted serially via a 
RS-232 connection using 8 bits/pixels. The 
image acquisition set-up is illustrated in 
Figure 2, where the camera is shown on a tripod, the video 
monitor is located at the left and the computer collection 
equipment is on the right. 
During the collection of images, each rest subject was 
asked to provide three sets of 10 images each. The 10 images 
correspond to looking at each of the 9 crosses painted on the 
wall to introduce tilt and angle variations, as shown in Figure 
2, and a tenth image looking at a random location within 
introduced with different facial expressions in each of the 
three sets. The first set was restricted to neutral expressions, 
the second set considered smiling expressions, and during the 
last set, subjects were asked to pronounce the vowel "u. " A 
total of 420 pictures were taken from 14 adult volunteers, and 
a sample of the database is shown in Figure 3. 
the boundary of crosses. In addition, variations were also 
In order to reduce the computation time, the initial 
160x 120 pi.xels image size was cropped to include 
only the face, resulting in images of size 60x45 (i.e. , 
rJ l ·l [JI'I 11 lJ IJ lJ r·l II 
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vectors oflength 2700), 
as shown in Figure 4 . 
--continued on page 53 
Figure 3 (left). 
Database sample. 
Figure 4 (above). 
Cropped IR face . 
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ANALYZING ELECTRIC POWER GRIDS UNDER TERRORIST THREAT 
Research Assistant Professor Javier Salmeron, Department of Operations Research 
Professor R. Kevin Wood, Department of Operations Research 
Professor R. Baldick, Department of Electrical Engineering, University of Texas at Austin 
Introduction 
The United States' electrical power system is critical to the 
cow1rry's economy and security. The system's vulnerability to 
natural disasters or physical attacks has been recognized, but 
this vulnerability has been increasing in recent years because 
of structural issues, and the threat of terrorist attacks has, of 
course, become more topical . The goal of this project is devel-
oping new mathematical models and optimization methods for 
robust planning of electrical power grids, focusing on securi ty 
and reliability with special emphasis on potential disruptions 
caused by sabotage and terrorist attacks. As an incentive 
to build these costly, robust networks, secondary economic 
benefits will be examined roo. 
Today, the U.S. electric system consists of an interconnected 
network of more than 6,000 generating units and 800,000 
km of bulk transmission lines, thousands of substations with 
high-voltage transformers, and a huge nwnber of lower-voltage 
transformers. The network is controlled by more than 100 
control centers coordinated in real time. Because current elec-
tric networks have been mostly designed following economic 
principles, i.e., low cost, they lack significant redundancy and 
minor failures , random or otherwise, can lead to severe system-
wide problems. 
Potential threats to rhe system , especially those coming 
from terrorist attacks, have been recognized in general terms 
for 20 years or more, but few steps have been taken to improve 
the situation. Recently, demand growth and increased marker 
competition have led to the system being operated with shrink-
ing reserves. The system is becoming very brittle. 
In this project, reasonable tradeoffs between security and 
cost are being explored. This implies the design of more 
robust systems, minimizing disruption and irs costs, while still 
making these systems efficient and attractive from an economic 
standpoint. 
The analys is helps address questions such as: "Which 
substations and other facilities are the most critical to protect?" 
and "How should they be prioritized?" "What is a reasonable 
capacity-expansion plan to contribute to increased security?" 
and "How does this new capacity facilitate competition in 
electricity markers?" 
Estimating Threats 
Terrorist attacks are easily conceivable: Most components of 
the electrical grid are unguarded and isolated. Terrorists could 
destroy critical components, which are vulnerable to simple 
explosives or rifle fire, and incapacitate large segments of rhe 
transmission netv.ro rk for weeks or even months. Indeed, elec-
trical power systems have been attacked, or are under continu-
ing attack, in several countries in Larin America, Africa and 
Asia. 
The greatest concerns are substations because they are 
easy to attack, difficult to repair and critical to system stability 
if chosen selectively. According to the Office ofTechnology 
Assessment, any region in me U.S . could suffer las ting and 
widespread blackouts if three or more substations were tar-
geted. In fact, loss of a key substation could possibly isolate a 
region and cause long-term power shortages. 
The cost of a blackout and me impact it might have on 
U.S. society are difficult to estimate. Costs are associated with 
the interruption of services that require electricity, i.e. , almost 
every activity. Utilities and public utili ty commissions estimate 
these costs by assessing me level of economic activity mat 
might have occurred if no blackout had happened agreeing 
that, in general, outage costs of non-supplied energy can be 
rated "between $1 and $5 per kWh. This imprecise estimate 
does not account for indirect and social costs mat cannot be 
quantified. 
Because utilities tend to overlook expensive protective 
measures when threats are deemed low, they typically plan 
for one failure (or at most two) to crucial equipment: The 
usual criterion is to have enough replacement capacity to 
cope with failure of me largest operating urut or transmission 
line. Failures range from "normal" failures for which utilities 
typically have well-prepared response plans to "major" failures 
which can be attributed to natural causes or manmade causes. 
Reliability can be improved through proactive and cor-
rective actions. The former, such as increasing transmission 
capacity for redundancy or improving me physical security 
at installations (e.g. , by hardening key elements such as build-
ing walls and increasing surveillance) are designed to prevent 
damage, or minimize its consequences. Corrective actions are 
established to recover normal system functionality in me least 
possible time. They can include training control-center opera-
tors and maintenance patrols for better dan1age assessment and 
prompt response, increasing spinning reserves, etc. 
--continued on page 39 
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Model Features and Examples 
An optimal interdiction (i.e., attack) model has been devised, subject 
lO limited interdiction resources. "Optimality" implies that the attack 
causes the largest possible disruption; "limited resources" implies 
combined attacks on system components, which terrorists might 
reasonably carry out simultaneously. By studying how to attack 
power grids, the researchers will ultimately understand how to protect 
them. By identifYing the largest disruptions that might be caused by 
attacks, the proposed protection plans will be appropriately conserva-
ove. 
The preliminary interdiction model and an algorithm for its solu-
tion have been tested using small- and medium-scale networks drawn 
fro m the IEEE's Reliability Test System (RTS) networks. Given the 
assumptions made on terrorist capabilities, the algorithm finds the 
combination of facilities (i.e., generating units, transmission lines, 
transformers and/ or substations) whose destruction would cause the 
largest or nearly largest disruption in the system at a given point in 
time. Finding these "target sets ," which in turn suggest th_e system 
components most in need of protection is difficult or impossible by 
simple inspection. 
Additional assumptions on the terrorists' potential are considered. 
For example, suppose that they may simultaneously and successfully 
interdict multiple elements of the electric grid depicted in Figure 
1 (from IEEE, and referred to as the RTS-One-Area grid). For 
simplicity of exposition, suppose that the terrorists' resources can be 
quantified as six people, and that one person is required to attack any 
transmission line; two people can attack an electrical bus (therefore 
isolating all the load, generation and lines connected to it); and three 
people can destroy the larger substation, which contains four large 
transformers, located in the middle of the RTS-One-Aiea grid. In 
general , the concept of terro rist "resources" can accommodate the 
available information from intelligence sources. The effect of a set of 
attacks are measured through the total load that must be shed, i.e., the 
total amount of demand for electricity that must go unmet. 
The algorithm finds many attack plan s, fro m which the following 
two are chosen to look at more closely: "Plan A" attacks the substation 
and three selected lines, and "Plan B" attacks six selected transmission 
lines , as depicted in Figure 1. Plan B sheds more instantaneous load 
than Plan A, but the total amount of unsupplied energy must be 
estimated while the effects of the attack las t. This entails establishing 
time lines, or "time regimes," for repair, and evaluating the resulting 
load-shedding patterns and their cost, over time. In the example, the 
11 5 MW of additional "short-term" load shedding in Plan B may 
be negligible when compared ro the long-term disruption caused by 
destroying the four transformers in the large substation. 
--continued on page 55 
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Figure 1. Two interdiction plans on Reliability Test 
System (RTS-One-Area). Total Load: 2,850 MW 
(Background illustration source, IEEE Transactions 
on Power Systems (1999)). 
-, ,., 
I 
<} ~ <.) .:X';",···,.,.... ~· \,( 
· ;'~f r'~r!:~- .. rr- ·· .. ~ 
·,; .... -/• .! ' 4l··w··1 j 1' r:) 
·;- . '~_;}~t;~~ . j' 6,, : 
~::) ~ : ~-~ ~;R/· ......... _ · ·.~. • . ~ , i-r-;~:tfi .· : ·~ f ~"-?S- t:·~-
1 , ···-· ./.! l,, ~-... ,,., 1 
1 
• ' ··r~ <"- I , 
1 . ! ""' • 
. ._ .. • -· 'f"''q -,~ ;: " If 
-"""'" .. 
_,.,.-~--.- ~--.,.,...~ " ~ ...;.. 
T-t-
. ;.~«<·--:·=--~ 
-~ -7~- i! "!. -· ., .,, 
..... ....,, 
~- .a-
'· . "''*'·~~ 
._.._.,' 
Plan B: Six lines are .. _ ·,. 
attached . Load shed- j - ' ' ·· f i l 





t:il (ltl,«, i< 
NPS Research - SPECIAL EDITION page 39 February 2003 
VULNERABILITY OF WIRELESS LOCAL AREA NETWORKS TO INTERCEPTION 
Associate Professor David C. Jenn, Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering 
LT Paul Sumagaysay, United States N avy HJl)J 
Many organizations are choosing wireless local 
area networks (WLANs) over hardwired networks 
because of their convenience and flexibility. One 
challenge in deploying systems that radiate in free 
space is the possibility of the signal being intercepted 
by unauthorized users . Even though the power levels 
involved are very low, a person just outside of a 
building or in a lobby could conceivably collect sen-
sitive information or possibly even disrupt the com-
puter network by injecting deceptive signals. 
Although complex encryption techniques make 
it difficult for the average person to penetrate the 
system, the algorithms that are built into the net-
work sofrware have been defeated by knowledgeable 
hackers. The first step in the hacking process is to 
gain unauthorized access to network traffic. In many 
cases this is most easily accomplished by intercepting 
wireless signals. 
Research at the NPS has examined the vulner-
ability ofWLANs to interception and provided 
some simple steps that can be taken to improve 
security. Commercially available sofrware was used 
to predict local mean signal power received at any 
given point in complex environment, such as the 
inside of a building. Figure 1 shows contours of 
signal strength in dBm (where dBm is a decibel 
relative to a milliwatt reference) at a height 5 feet 
above the ground for a two story metal composite 
building. The building footprint is a square, 40 
feet on a side, and the WLAN access point is 
-~ 
located on the first floor at the + symbol. t 
Typical WLAN receiver sensitivities range from :>< 
-94 dBm for 1 Mbps to -85 dBm for 11 Mbps. 
Therefore, no interception would be possible in 
the dark blue areas. Note that at the lowest data 
rate, interception is possible over most of the com-
putational grid, which is 150 feet on a side. Figure 
2 shows that the power levels outside of the build-
ing have been reduced significantly by moving the 
access point to the second floor and replacing the 
standard windows by tinted glass. 
-400-
., . 
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Figure 1. Power levels for a building with metal composite walls 
and standard glass windows. Units are decibels relative to a 
milliwatt (dBm). Strong signals passing through the windows 
are evident. 
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The fact that the WLAN is contained inside 
a dosed building gives a false sense of security. 
--continued on page 41 
Figure 2. Outside power levels are reduced using tinted glass and 
moving the access point to the second floor, which reflects signals 
back into the building. 
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Research Associate Professor Jovan Lebaric, Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering 
T he Concealed Weapons Detection project for 
Homeland Security Defense is aimed at providing 
a means of detecting concealed weapons at greater 
range than existing systems. Existing technology 
uses near field, magnetically coupled detectors that 
requires that the target individual be in dose prox-
imity to the detector, typically within a foot or 
less. This does not allow for any advance warning 
to security personnel. Indeed, several years ago 
an individual carrying a concealed weapon walked 
into the U.S. Capitol building. The near field 
detectors at the entrance sounded an alarm, but 
the intruder at that time was ready to shoot and 
he fatally shot two guards and seriously wounded 
the third, before being shot himself. This incident 
vividly illustrated the need for an advanced warn-
ing of an individual carrying a concealed weapon 
approaching a security 
checkpoint, as did the 
July 2002 attack at the 
LAX airport. 
This need was 
confirmed in a meeting 
with a representative of 
the U.S. Department 
of Justice and in a follow-on meeting with the U.S. 
Secret Service representatives in Washington, DC. 
To address this need, a ne~ approach to this prob-
lem has been developed and implemented. At the 
time of writing, the proprietary Phase I work has 
been completed, which is anticipated to be patent-
able. 
The process used tools including self-developed 
electromagnetics software, as well as the CST Micro-
wave Studio software as a tool for simulation and 
design. A sample model from simulation is shown at 
left in Figure 1. 
Theoretical results are being validated by experi-
mental measurements in the Department of Electri-
cal and Computer Engineering's Microwave Lab, 
using the experimental setup shown in Figure 2 
above right. 
Three M .S. in Electrical Engineering candidates 
Figure 1. Simulation. are working with the faculty researchers 
Figure 2. Experimental System Setup. 
VULNERABILITY OF 
WIRELESS LOCAL AREA 
NETWORKS, cmytinued fi·om page 40 
,d·:·: 
Many small busine~~~~ use WIANs, 
yet system administrators are not aware 
of the susceptibility of these systems to 
interception, or feel that they do not 
have the resources to tighten security. 
However, this researchhas shown that 
some simple steps can be taken to 
reduce the probability of interception, 
such as: locating acc~ss points in the 
most interior builqing spaces; dosing 
all exterior doors artdl~indows, and 
using metal blinds o; tinting on exte-
rior windows. 
NPS Research - SPECIAL EDITION page 41 February 2003 
INTELLIGENT SOFTWARE DECOYS 
Associate Professor Bret Michael, Department of Computer Science 
Professor Neil Rowe, Department of Computer Science 
Associate Professor Mikhail Auguston, Department of Computer Science 
Associate Professor Doron Drusinsky, Department of Computer Science 
Research Professor Richard Riehle, Department of Computer Science 
Senior Lecturer Hy Rothstein, Department of Defense Analysis 
LCDR Valter Montiero, Brazilian Navy 
Maj Donald Julian, United States Marine Corps 
Capt George Fragkos, Hellenic Army 
LTJG Engin Uzuncaova, Turkish Navy 
Mr. Thomas Wingfield, Esq. , Man Tech Aegis 
Research Corporation 
The genesis of this project dates back to a series of discussions 
that took place in the winter of 200 1 in the course tided 
Distributed Operating Sys tems, in which Professor M ichael 
and his students identified challenges associated with achiev-
ing high levels of securi ty in distributed operating systems. 
Some of the unique capabilities of distributed in contrast 
to network operating systems, such as managing distributed 
objects using a global naming space, led Professor Michael to 
explore how deception could be used in distributed comput-
ing to protect critical components of the information infra-
structure against the effects of attacks. The research blos-
somed when Professor Riehle teamed with Professor Michael 
to create the first proto type of what they call an inteLLigent 
software decoy, with novel capabilities such as disguising and 
cloning itself by modifying its contract interface at run-time 
(via the use of polymorphic argument types) . Based on that 
work, Professor Michael received initial funding from the 
N PS Institutionally Funded Research (NIFR) Program and 
the Naval Research Laboratory (NRL) to further investigate 
his new securi ty paradigm , the results of which were published 
in [ 1]. In addition , this work was showcased at the 2001 
Eiffel Programming Language Workshop (held in conjw1ction 
with the IEEE Conference on Technology for Object-Ori-
ented Languages and Systems) and the Fleet Information 
Warfare Center's Navy Information Operations/Warfare 
(NIOW) 2002 Technology Symposium & Exposition , along 
with an article that appeared in the D efense Information 
System Agency's !Anewsfetter [2] . 
Intelligent softv.rare decoys provide a m ean s for automat-
ing, to a degree, counterintelligence activities and responses 
to cyber attacks. The decoys embody what we refer to as 
software-based deception as a means for hardening operational 
sys tems against attacks by sophisticated information warriors: 
these warriors, whether sponsored by nation-states, terrorist 
organizations, or organized crime, continuously update their 
arsenal of custom-designed cyber weapons for use against 
specific targets of their attacks. In our paradigm, critical units 
of software are wrapped with "decoying" rules, which are the 
cyber embodiment of both the policy (including doctrine) 
of an organization or individual for conducting counterintel-
ligence and applying countermeasures against attackers. The 
wrappers are placed around critical units of software (e.g., a 
component or method) to be protected . By critical , we mean 
units of software that are integral to the continued surviv-
ability of an information system and the correct enforcement 
of the policy embedded in the system. 
When a wrapper detects a suspicious pattern of system 
calls by one or more computer processes, it begins to conduct 
counterintelligence tasks and initiates countermeasures; pat-
tern recognition is performed at runtime. In contrast to con-
ventional securi ty paradigms, the wrappers, which we refer 
to as :'decoys," conduct counterintelligence by trying to main-
tain their interaction with suspicious processes, thus allowing 
for the collection of information about the nature of the 
processes' behavior. T he wrappers respond to requests for 
service from the processes by applying countermeasures, with 
coordination of their responses provided by "decoy supervi-
sors." T he countermeasures include actions taken to shield 
the wrapped software fro m any ill effects of the interaction , 
and the responses to the processes that are needed to deceive 
the attacker in to concluding that his or her computer proc-
esses are successfully carrying out their mission. As new 
patterns of suspicious behavior are discovered , the database 
of rules for counterintelligence and countermeasure actions is 
updated via machine-learning techniques so that the decoys 
can adapted to the defend against newly discovered types of 
attacks. Our initial architecture for intelligent software decoys 
was introduced in [3]. 
H omeland securi ty within the United States encompasses, 
among other things, the protection of public and private 
cybernetic property against espionage and sabotage, especially 
if such a compromise would have a significan t adverse effect 
on the national securi ty of the United States . Like other 
--continued on page 43 
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securiry mechanisms for protecting information systems, it is 
likely that cyber decoys will in some instances be misused. In 
the United States, criminal law provides us with analogies for 
preventing or punishing improper state use of deception, and 
criminal and civil law give us a range of tools to use against 
private actors . However, in addition to states, nongovernmen-
tal entities and individuals can employ cyber decoys. During 
the first phase the project under the aegis of Naval Post-
graduate School's Homeland Securiry Leadership Development 
Program, Professor Michael and Mr. Wingfield-who is a 
lawyer and expert in national securiry affairs-performed a 
principled analysis of the use of cyber decoys , with the aim of 
better understanding the absolute minima in terms of custom-
ary principles for what might be considered to be acceptable 
use of deception. We used a particular rype of cybernetic 
properry-a public-switched telephone network (PSTN)-to 
explore societal and legal issues associated with applying 
deception. The results of this work to date [ 4] will be pre-
sented in May of this year at the IFIP International Confer-
ence on Information Securiry in May of this year; an earlier 
paper [5] discusses in detail the four principles of the jus in 
bello as it applies to software decoys and their use in protecting 
the semantic web-the semantic web as an enabling technol-
ogy that could be used by the Homeland Securiry Department 
as tool to fight terrorism, but the semantic web itself needs 
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to be protected. 
During 2002 we made some significant strides forward on 
multiple technical fronts. We developed a high-level formal 
language we named CHAJ'v!ELEON for specifying patterns of 
suspicious behavior and decoy responses to such patterns; 
this work will also be presented at the upcoming IFIP Interna-
tional Conference on Information Securiry [ 6] and is based 
to a large extent on the thesis research of one of our students 
[7]. Our paper contains a detailed case study of how one can 
specify detection-and-response actions in CHAMELEON based 
on computations over event traces for a real-life sophisticated 
attack program. We have begun work on building a compiler 
to translate specifications written in CHAMELEON into an 
intermediate-level specification needed by the NAI Generic 
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Figure 1. A high-level view of the decoy creation-and-maintenance process as described in [7]. 
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Network Management at the application level is implicit 
in SolarWinds capabilities. As an application is running, 
irs effects on the network can be monitored and managed. 
Additionally, if an application requires supporting services 
(protocols, ports, etc.) their status can be determined and 
managed by SolarWinds. 
While Solar Winds provides a fairly diverse set of tools to 
support the management of individual elements in a network, 
it does not provide direct tools for Service and Business layer 
management. For Ubiquitous Surveillance in its deployed 
mode, there will be a need for application and service layer 
services at a minimum due to the sheer volume of sensors 
envisioned. It would be desirable to have business layer 
services as well, although it is our assessment that it is not 
strictly necessary for successful employment. 
For the purposes of the testbed demonstration, the 
Solar Winds MIB Walk tool was run on each of the nodes 
operating. The results of the MIB "walk" were captured and 
an abbreviated set for the client was taken. The discussion 
and results with regard to management of configuration, fault, 
traffic, and security monitoring are drawn from these data. 
There are 11 major groups ofRFC121 3 MIB variables that 
are commonly used. Some, such as address translation, are 
deprecated from MIB I and no longer considered useful. 
With the exception of system variables, these groups are 
not homogenous with respect to the management functions of 
the NMS. Each has variables that are used for configuration, 
traffic management (performance), and fault management. 
Security is not an inherent function of individual variables, 
although significant work is being done in this field to utilize 
them as such. For each of these network management func-
tions, a representative sample of MIB variables was selected, 
examined, and the findings presented. The presumption was 
made that these variables are used by Solar Winds as part of 
network management although no direct link could be estab-
lished between the variables and the output of the Solar Winds 
system. 
Configuration Management Variables/Group 
Configuration m anagement is a broad concept that covers 
many different facets of the network model. It can refer to a 
particular device's location, what services are enabled/disabled, 
what actions are pre-set, etc. For each of the testbed nodes, 
there were literally dozens, if not hundreds, of MIB variables 
that related to configuration. A representative sample of these 
is described below, illustrating the type of MIB variables that 
are used for configuration by the NMS. 
The RFC12l 3 "system" group is virtually all configuration 
variables. There are numerous other configuration variables 
that are part of other "groups" each dealing with specific layers 
of the OSI model. The interfaces group consists in large part 
of layer 2 MIB variables. 
It is important to note that most, if not all, of the 
9 "groups" listed in RFC12l 3 (MIB II) and 1060 (MIB 
I) contain configuration variables. The IP "group" handles 
layer 3 conditions and had different methods for moniroring 
performance. 
Fault M~agement 
Fault management is of prime concern in a ubiquitous surveil-
lance network. If the network is to be relied upon it must 
be fault tolerant and have robust fault handling features. 
Fortunately this is a strength of SNMP and its associated MIB 
variables (both MIB II and proprietary). While the current 
implementation uses fault detection and reporting, there is 
current research in this area using intelligent agents to do fault 
prediction based on subtle network changes, and fault analysis 
using replicated MIBs to record the values of "crashed" net-
work elements. 
Tra.flic Monitoring 
The term ''traffic monitoring" is fairly broad and can include 
elements of both fault and security management. It is there-
fore examined here with a narrower focus--just Performance 
Management. Performance management considers factors 
such at network throughput, response times, line utilization 
etc. 
In a heterogeneous network such as the one described 
in the scenario , there will likely be multiple transmission 
protocols running on multiple types of vendor equipment. 
As a result, the MIB variables that are key to monitoring 
performance may vary somewhat among protocols. This can 
be compared with the RFC 121 3 variables found on the server 
node MIB on the testbed (which are presumably monitored 
by SolarWinds). 
Security Management 
Network and systems security is primarily concerned with five 
areas: authentication, access control, data confidentiality, 
data integrity, and non-repudiation. Currently, MIB II as 
defined in RFC 12 13 has few objects that relate directly to 
--continued on page 47 
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blender either as input or a generic space and become con-
nected to other mental spaces. The result is a growing scale-
free network of mental spaces. The integration network gets 
more and more complicated. More and more mental spaces 
are combined with it as it goes through its process. 
Results 
The subject matter expert has produced a collection of data 
that is formatted in a specific way to work with our blender. 
The subject matter expert has constructed a data set of over 
300 items that became known to the subject. Each item 
was tracked so that we knew when it became known to the 
subject. Approximately 20% of this data set has been tagged 
and packaged by the subject matter expert. That means that 
for each item the information has been placed in a formatted 
blended space with connectors extended that represent the 
type of information contained in the space. Subject matter 
expert has also produced about 50 kinds of mental spaces 
that are supported in the form of generic spaces. For each 
generic space there is an interior structure that describes in 
very abstract terms that kind of operation or information. 
--continued on page 48 
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security or easily lend themselves to security management. 
Current research shows that some MIB variables can be 
used as indicators of particular types of attacks 
Most managed security objects (i.e. MIB variables) are 
implemented by individual vendors of network equipment, 
rather than relying on MIB II variables. These security objects 
are frequently found in firewalls or in networking equipment 
that can perform at least basic filtering such as routers or 
switches. 
The actual implementation and deployment of a ubiq-
uitous surveillance nenvork has numerous obvious security 
concerns. Not addressed directly in this paper are the vulner-
abilities associated with the physical security of the sensors, 
nodes, and possible physical links that are part of the network. 
Physical access to any of these points by an enemy is prob-
lematic and makes the defense of the network much more 
difficult. 
Aggregated Network Management 
From a network management perspective SolarWinds does an 
admirable job at providing numerous aggregated views of the 
network that are drawn from the polling of MIB variables. 
These views represent the network, network element, and 
limited inference about the application layers of the TMN 
management model. There appears to be no direct way 
to determine exactly which MIB variables are used by each 
performance or monitoring module. 
From a military perspective, there exists an imperative to 
be able to trust the integrity of the system and the outputs 
of that system. It would therefore be required that the rela-
tionship between the application and the MIB variables be 
disclosed and known. 
Dynamics of Monitoring Process, Data Analysis Tasks, and 
Distribution of Management Roles 
For the purposes of the testbed, the dynamics of monitoring 
the networks is trivial since there are rwo nodes, both com-
pletely physically controlled. The same holds true for the 
tasks of conducting data analysis and the distribution of man-
agement roles. These topics become important when a larger 
system is considered, such as in a deployed version of the 
ubiquitous surveillance network. 
In this scenario, monitoring should be as automated 
as possible and data analysis augmented by automated tools. 
This may require the integration of a decision support system 
to augment the process. Lastly, the distribution of manage-
ment roles will strictly be a fwKtion of doctrine, tactics, 
techniques, and procedures, all of which are purely speculative 
at this point. 
Conclusion 
The results of this research will provide vital management 
information for structuring wireless network surveillance and 
monitoring process by the Nemesis Van operators. One of 
the major findings is the set of key SNMP MIB management 
variables that are most critical for security, fault, performance, 
and configuration management of the wireless networks that 
include video sensors, pattern recognition app lications , as 
well as mobile and fixed communication nodes. Finally, the 
results provide the model of step-by-step implementation of 
COTS network management sys tem, the SolarWinds tool, 
for conducting the operations at the Nemesis Van NOC. The 
network operation site assembled on the floor of the GIGA 
Code Lab will be used as a static NOC working in tandem 
with the Nemesis Van mobile NOC. 
NPS Research - SPECIAL EDITION page 47 February 2003 
INTEGRATED ASYMMETRIC GOAL ORGANIZATION, continuedftompage47 
The attack generic space described earlier is an example of 
such a generic space. 
Our blending software has produced its first experimental 
blends. To our knowledge, this is the first example of a 
computational model based on software agents to achieve 
conceptual blending. Detailed software requirements and 
specifications are complete in a design document. Our soft-
ware consists of about 140 classes of Java code, 25 of which 
are part of the human interface (called a GUI) . IAGO's 
human interface will support the following operations: 
• Animated visualization of the process of combining 
inputs to form blended spaces. 
• Visualization of networks of the blended spaces (integra-
tion networks). 
• Textual trace of the information elements produced in the 
new blends. 
• Ability to examine new blends as they are produced. 
• Support for collecting blends linking behavior and deci-
sions to a sequence (string) of blends. 
Limited funding has brought IAGO to the point where 
after six months of effort we are able to demonstrate that com-
putational blending is possible and that multi-agent software 
blending can be applied to support the anticipation of subject 
behavior. 
Methodology 
Our computational model of blending results from a combi-
nation of multi-agent system techniques. These include 
tickets, connectors, composite agents, and networks. A ticket 
consists of one or more frames . Each frame contains an 
operation or information item that has a specific type. In 
IAGO there are two types of tickets - one that contains 
data and one that contains information about operations. 
The data tickets have connectors extended to describe to the 
ourside world - the world outside the ticket- what the frames 
contain. The active or operational tickets contain the steps 
or sequences of operations. Connectors are based on an anal-
ogy with the way receptors and control work in biological 
cells. In the software world connectors have the following 
operations. They can be extended which means that their 
type information is known outside of the agent or they can 
be retracted which means that type information is pulled back 
inside the agent. An extended connector is waiting for a 
complementary or matching connector. When two connec-
tors match, the operation is called a connection. A connector 
consists of a head part with type information and a tail part 
of a ticket. When two connectors match, the corresponding 
tickets inside the two agents execute so the operational tickets 
begin to execute. In our blending example a connector match 
may link an input space in the input 1 position with the 
blender. The ticket execution inside the blender causes new 
connectors to be extended at the generic space and input 2 
positions. A cascading sequence of connectors is extended 
as the blending process continues. Agent techniques at 
NPS have focused on composite agents that have interior sub-
agents. The motivation is to create software agents that 
move in the direction of biological cells in terms of their 
autonomy and coordination with each other. Agents form 
networks through the connection process. When two agents 
have successfully matched their connectors, that connection 
is converted into a persistent link. The result is a growing 
network of agents. By basing the links on the connection 
process, our multi-agent system is able to satisfY the two 
requirements for forming scale-free networks: incremental 
addition of links and preferential attachment of links. We 
mean preferential in terms of the intent or goals of the 
agents that have formed the connection so that the appli-
cation level intent is what is guiding the construction 
of the network links. 
Conclusion 
The first phase of IAGO has shown that MAS computational 
Model can achieve software blending. T his blending process 
has produced new mental spaces from input streams collected 
from research into the behavior of a subject involved in asym-
metric warfare. First phase software demonstrates that com-
parisons may be made between the behavior of the real subject 
and decisions that follow from the computational model. The 
Blends produced in the subject model yield insight into the 
subject's conceptual context for behavior. 
We are now planning the next phase of IAGO work, a 
year-long project seeking to build an application test bed that 
will place software blenders in the input data steam created 
by our Subject Matter Expert. This step of the project will 
integrate the human interface GUI and software blenders 
so that we can conduct quantitative work at an application 
level. At this point IAGO will support exploration and 
experim entation with the conceptual context of a modeled 
subject. 
IAGO has extended the Autonomous Software work of the 
MOVES Institute. Software Blending opens new possibilities 
--continued on page 50 
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are typical in weather factors generated by any atmospheric 
model. The WOCSS-derived trajectories had to be validated 
by observations from an in situ collection of wind speed, 
direction, and temperature. A basic is~ue being addressed 
information to the best mesoscale vector wind pro@e and tur-
bulent mixing estimates to justifY the additional expenditure 
UAV time and resources. 
in the demonstration was whether assimilating the very latest 
observations within the region of the plume adds enough 
In the demonstration mode, a data collection/calibration/ 
validation campaign was mounted on the boundary layer 
vector wind and turbulence-controlled mixing. Data col-
Table 1-1. MET Ground-Station -Continuous Operation 
Parameter Instrument Installation Requirements Physical Descripti on 
Wind Speed RM Young Instruments mounted Instrument Assembly 
in well exposed weighs 10 pounds 
Wind Direction Wind Monitor location for good measuring 2'x3'x6" 
air flow characteristi cs mounted on 10ft mast. 
Air Temperature Rotronics Temp/ 
RH Probe 
Relative Humidity 
Data Logger Campbell Data logger mounted Data Logger Assembly 
Scientific near AC power, weighs 20 pounds 
CR10X with in 1 00 ft of and measures 
Instrument Mast 12"x14"x6" 
Monitor Laptop PC PC located in operations Requires about 
space within 1 00 ft of Data 2 sq ft desk space 
Logger 
Table 1-2. Rawinsonde Operations 
Rawinsonde System (1) Insta llation Requirements Physica l Description 
404 Mhz rawinsonde Antenna Antennae mounted high 6 in dia x 5 ft typically 
with good exposure ra il mounted on 
4 ft x 2" nominal dia . pipe 
GPS rawinsonde Antenna 3"dia x 2" high rail mounted 
on 1"dia pipe 
Rawinsonde Receiver Rawinsonde Receiver and MRS Receiver 
Monitor occupy approx Weighs 70 lbs 
24"x 48" desktop space 18"x18"x24" 
Rawinsonde Laptop PC PC- Sibs 
Monitor and Printer Printer -10 lbs 
Rawinsonde Rawinsonde Storage Required approx 10 cu ft. in 
Expendables Kites & operations areas 
accessories Kites an accessories up 6 ft in length 
Balloon Launch Shelter Located in exterior 6 ft DIA x 4 ft high 
operations area 
Helium 2-5 cylinder storage near 
launch shelter 
Operations Support: Spare Parts Stowed unless failure 200 lbs, 20 cu ft and Tools 
lection was performed at the demonstra-
tion site. The collection was done with 
3 grow1d-stations and one Rawinsonde 
system to apply to the time varying 
3-D description (i.e. 4D) of the test 
volume. The ground-station systems 
operated continuously during the entire 
time collection period with sensors listed 
in Table 1. The Rawinsonde system 
(Table 2) was used at scheduled times to 
collect profiles of vector winds, tempera-
ture, and humidity at pressure levels. 
The continuous ground-based 
measurements, schedule driven vertical 
profile measurements, provided measure-
ments of the time and space separated 
atmospheric parameters that control dis-
persion and are required to initialize 
numerical models. The field collected 
data were those used to evaluate the suit-
abili ty of and to correct the atmospheric 
forecasts as well as to update the toxic 
plume sampling and response strategy. 
With ground stations as well as sensors 
mounted aboard small unit deployed 
portable UAVs, everything just men-
tioned would be available in an opera-
tional mode. 
To accomplish the in situ 
ground based continuous measurements, 
three portable instrumented meteorolog-
ical (Met) towers were installed on 2 
October 2002 and in continuous opera-
tion until removed 5 November 2002. 
The tower designation and location, rela-
tive to the runway, are: 
• West Tower (SMOKE 1) 
• East Tower (SMOKE 3) 
• North Tower (SMOKE 2) 
--continued on page 50 
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With regard to the location at 
McMillan Field demonstration site at 
Camp Roberts, the runway is oriented 
from SE to NW with a taxiway and 
hanger on the S side of the SE end, Fig 
1. Smoke 1, the west Met tower, was 
located about 50 feet south of the NW 
end of the runway. Smoke 2, the north 
Met tower, was located on a hill several 
hundred feet North of the midpoint of 
the runway. Smoke 3, the east Met 
tower, was located about 50 feet north 
of the SE end of the runway 
Figure 3. Instrumented portable meteorological (MET) tower installed at 
Macmillan Field. Instrumentation in Table 1 above. 
The towers were instrumented (Table 1) 
for true vector wind (speed and direc-
tion reference to true North) , air pres-
sure, air temperature and humidity with identical sensors 
except that the West and North towers (SMOKE 1 and 
SMOKE 2) have temperature and humidity sensors at one 
level only whereas the East tower (SMOKE 3) has tempera-
ture and humidity sensors at two levels. The sensors were 
sampled at 1 H z and the output averaged over a two-minute 
interval. 
INTEGRATED ASYMMETRIC GOAL 
ORGANIZATI.2 N, continuedfi'ompage48 
for multi-agenti~~Sf~:Jj ~oftware Blending produce;: bi-
directional Integratioh.Networks. This produces three 
important consequences. First, agents with this capability 
may go beyond working with remembered facts to pro-
duce new knowledge that is connected and linked to their 
iment and to their past. Second, when these agents move 
forward along their Integration Networks, producing new 
blends from previous knowledge, they begin to know what 
they know. And conversely, a different process in the 
agent can move ba~ from the latest blends to s.arlier 
mental spaces to produce new blends that conta.iti knowl-
edge about how the agent knows what it knows. 
By combining Composite Agents, multi-agent SyStems, 
Connectors~ and Integration Net\'Vorks, the .first phase 
IAGO project has brought us to the prospect of building 
cognitive agents that can extend their Conceptual Blends 
based on new experience, a capability that will allow them 
to answer the question, "What are you doing?" 
Up/down and balloon tethered rawinsondes were launched 
from a site near the mid-point of the runway at times before, 
during, and after UAV sampling. With up/down rawin-
sondes, data is received from the sonde both during a balloon-
ascent and a parachute descent. This provides a better charac-
terization of low altitude atmospheric conditions than with an 
ascending rawinsonde. It also, provides a three dimensional 
description of the fields since location is known due to the 
GPS or Loran navigation inherent in the vector wind deter-
mining component of the system. The spatial separation of 
these profiles will depend on sonde trajectories due to the 
ambient wind encountered. 
The sonde and its parachute were released from the balloon 
using a timer-release mechanism . The timer was set to release 
the sonde at an altitude of about 1 km fo r the first launch of 
each day, at which point it descended by parachute back to 
the surface. This height was more than ample to characterize 
the low altitude atmospheric conditions affecting dispersion 
and for evaluation of the mesoscale model. Release heights 
of fo llowing rawinsonde flights were set based on an analys is 
of the profile data from the previous sounding. Additional 
balloon-borne (tethered) rawinsondes profiles of the near-sur-
face atmosphere (up to about 50-m) were performed through 
out the collection as weather and time conditions permitted . 
These kite-borne sondes should provide a direct measurement 
of the near surface thermal structure, and thus derails of 
the buoyancy influenced dispersion . The mesoscale models 
address properties at these scales . 
T he UAV weather (m et) observations for model appli-
--continued on page 51 
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cation with regard to spatial and temporal accuracy were 
evaluated. Meteorological observations from the UAVs that 
directly impact the atmospheric modeling effort are wind 
speed, direction, temperature, location. (altitude, pressure, and 
latitude/longitude) , and time (UTC). However, the primary 
one is wind speed and direction. The sampling frequency 
of the UAV is far beyond what is useful for a modeling 
comparison; so temporal averaging of the observations was 
required. Tolerable errors in observations of the atmospheric 
parameters were considered to be 1.0 m s·', 1.0 °, 1.0 K, 
5.0 m , 1.0 millibar, 0.005 °, and 5.0% for wind speed, direc-
tion , temperature, altitude, pressure, latitude/longitude, and 
relative humidity, respectively. 
UAV Instrumentation, Data CoLLection and Processing: 
Figure 4 represents the planned architecture for the UAV-
ground station hardware. Preparation and testing for the 
demonstration was based on this set-up. The UAV was 
the Bai Tern (renamed a Frog) with 10.5' wingspan and 75 
pound maximum takeoff weight. The data was collected by 
the onboard data acquisition system and transmitted to the 
ground station via a pair of serial RF modems. In operational 
modes, the Data Acquisition and Processing Computer on the 
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Figure 4. FROG Hardware and Connectivity. 
ground will do all the necessary data processing to provide the 
Meteorology Code with the rewired data message, averaged 
over a pre-specified time interval. For this demonstration, 
the aircraft was flown by the UAV pilot. Additional guidance 
cues to the pilot will be developed as necessary. 
UAV Demonstration Results 
The UAV principal eventual role in this project will be to 
both map the effective plume dispersion in the atmosphere 
and provide the wind estimation for the prediction of Chem/ 
Bio agent dispersion. The present role was to make meteo-
ro logical observations that directly impact the atmospheric 
modeling effort: wind speed, direction, temperature, location 
(altitude, pressure, and latitude/longitude), and time (UTC). 
A one- to two-minute average of atmospheric observations 
will be sufficiently useful for ingestion into the models. 
The UAV results of significance in this demonstration 
relate to wind comparisons. There are few types of data that 
determine spatial position of the UAV that is collected for the 
wind estimation purpose. Data of an airframe is represented 
by an air velocity and angles of attack and sideslip. Data 
measured in a body frame by the IMU sensors is represented 
l~i~A.Jl 
Fr<>g: 
by the accelerations, angular rates and magnetic 
vector variations. GPS data provides direct mea-
surements of the coordinates, ground velocity 
and ground-tracking angle that are required for 
wind estimation model. 
The wind estimation model has been imple-
mented in a Simulink environment. Real-Time 
Workshop tool provides an ability to execute 
this model in a remote computer in real time. 
Conclusions 
The atmospheric mesoscale model results 
showed promise in capturing the ·* 'r"- · ,L , . . ~ ,.., •;· i .. ,3 I · • nl! '"'•1·'a. 1 ~ ,k.e:!lz;e"' diurnal evolution of near surface 
o•;er ,:,.neftv;n;. 




~tat c• r'J 
temperatures that drive the local 
circulations in the warm season. 
The model consistently underes-
timated the daytime heating at 
the ground and yet maintained 
a reasonable wind and atmo-
spheric stability forecast. Trajec-
tories based on model forec.o1.sts 
showed a reasonable path for the 
--continued on page 52 
NPS Research - SPECIAL EDITION page 51 February 2003 
TEMS 
INTEGRATION OF UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES AND NAVAL SPECIAL WARFARE 
OPERATIONS, continued from page 31 
coordinates). This location was then plotted by the C2 ele-
ment. Only one data point could be collected for each force 
(IR strobe). 
While all specific MOEs could not be evaluated due to 
the limitations placed on the experiment, enough data were 
gathered to demonstrate or infer a positive impact from the 
use ofUAVs. Positive target identification will require more 
sophisticated equipment, but even the simple IR strobes used 
in this LOE could help improve target identification if used 
creatively. Force protection could be greatly enhanced if 
the low-light camera were replaced with a thermal-imaging 
camera. The unique IR strobe placed on the red force during 
the LOE represented this capability and greatly enhanced 
force protection simply by knowing the location of any enemy 
personnel within the op area. The average SA differences for 
the flights conducted with the UAV were much lower than 
the average SA for all other forces without the UAV. A direct 
improvement to situational awareness for the C2 element can 
be seen in Table 2. 
This research demonstrated that the use of an inexpensive, 
small UAV carrying, in this case, a low-light camera and 
simulated communications relay capability, launched by rear 
echelon personnel, flown by onboard autonomous avionics to 
prescribed and changeable waypoints, emitting live video feeds 
to both the SEAL platoon in the field as well as the C2 
element in the rear, 
proved to have a def-
lrute posmve 1mpact 
on the combat effec-
tiveness of NSW 
forces. While the 
experiment did not 
come to full fruition, 
much data was col-
lected, and analysis 




don't need, nor do 
they desire, to be 
burdened with the 
requirement of 
launching or flying 
the UAV. The con-
cept of the TOC 
Table 2. Situational Awareness 
Data 
Non-UAV Data: 
Blue Alpha 04NOV ...... .... ...... 7.1 
Red Alpha 04NOV ............ 25.0 
Pilot Alpha 04NOV ............... , ... 2.8 
Blue Bravo 04~.Q ............... 3.1 
Red Bravo 04 · ' · 
Pilot Bravo 04 .......... .. 2.8 
Blue Alpha 05NOvf i~®:11lt ! . : .......... 6.7 
Red Alpha 05NOV :• ...... Unknown! 
Pilot Alpha 05Npv: .... ............. 3.0 
Blue Bravo 05NOV ....... .. ........ 6.6 
Red Bravo 05NOV ...... . Unknown! 
Pilot Bravo 05NOV .................. 1 .1 
UAV Data: ·············· ,, 
Blue Alpha 05D~Q;·: ..... ,. ....... .. 2.0 
Red Alpha osD~c'~ :~: ............... 1.o 
Pi lot Alpha 05DEC: ................. O.O 
located at the Forward Operating Base (FOB), launching the 
UAV for the inserted NSW patrol, has been proven to be valid 
concept within an 8km range. This range will surely increase 
--continued on page 53 
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given large-scale conditions but were not verified. Future work 
would include incorporating observations into the model ini-
tialization to correct for the cold daytime temperature bias 
and examine the impact on successive temperature and trajec-
tory forecasts. Another aspect worth future exploration is 
the quality of the model forecasts over a broader range of 
meteorological conditions, validating model performance for 
cold as well as warm season conditions. 
Linking WOCSS with the atmospheric mesoscale model 
forecasts showed no significant improvement in wind forecasts 
when compared to the mesoscale model wind forecasts alone. 
This is an artifact of the test site being located in an open flat 
basin, where WOCSS essentially acts as an interpolator of the 
larger-scale weather information. An ideal future test would 
take place at a site having peaks and valleys unresolved by 
the coarse horizontal grid spacing of the mesoscale model. 
Linking WOCSS to the trajectory visualization code revealed 
serious shortcomings in the estimate of the verrical wind 
component that needs to be improved for future tests. 
Another avenue of future work will be to examine how 
incorporating actual observations into WOCSS will impact 
WOCSS-derived trajectory forecasts. 
Overall the demonstration proved the feasibility of 
linking a coarse grid mesoscale model to a fine scale diagnos-
tic wind model for producing fine resolution forward and 
backward trajectories. As mentioned above, several challenges 
were noted which will provide future research opportunities 
to improve on the mesoscale model- diagnostic wind model 
methodology as a tool for defending against C hemBio weapon 
attacks. Another very important aspect of future work is the 
actual transition ofWOCSS and the HYSPLIT visualization/ 
trajectory code to a laptop for a portable capability. This 
study demonstrated that is was possible to transition to the 
field Laptop computer. 
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Face Recognition Schemes 
Numerous classification schemes 
have been reported in the face rec-
ognition literature. Classical and 
widely used approaches are based 
on eigenface (Principal Com-
ponent Analysis) and Fisherface 
(Linear Discriminant Analysis) 
concepts and/or their variants 
Gtopped lm~ge··~~ Grealtt framre rp;;-p,·r 
Files i 
~"'"'""............,""""'--·~...,..=~v.·.~--~~: 
• i Dimension reduction • ""' & 
. Featur~ e:xtracUcn 
"" Dat®aJ·-r C cH.u:#mt 
(N p<'opt.rJ 
~I 
[ 1 ,4] . These schemes are designed 
to linearly project the image information 
omo smaller dimensional spaces, where dis-
t 
Tnf/fJing Phas~ 2700xN 
J>i$pl(r)• CJ~ l)r.c;l~<'o ll 
crimination operations are con-
ducted. Recent results reported 
by Selinger and Socolinsky show 
that an LOA-based approach 
Tat Sl4bjref 
fe:atures ·e:xtraotion 
has better classification rate than 
the PCA for cooled thermal 
~- '--·~-···- Figure 5. Overall face 
recognition process 
implemented. imagery [2], similar to results observed for 
visible imagery data. 
Testing Phase 2100 <1 
Recall that the goal of the study was to investigate 
whether face recognition schemes may be applied to uncooled 
IR imaging data with success. As a result, two basic linear 
PCA and LOA projection schemes were implemented with 
the long-term goal to use them as benchmarks against more 
sophisticated schemes in the currently proposed follow-on 
srudy. Figures 5, 6 and 7 summarize the basic idea behind 
(training) stage, and the decision (testing) stage, respectively. 
The dataset is split into two portions: training and testing 
datasets, where the training set is applied to design the clas-
sification algorithm, while the testing set is used to test 
the algorithm classification robustness. Cropped images of 
size 60x45 are reshaped as one-dimensional vectors of size 
2700x l. Figure 5 shows that reshaped training vectors 
the overall face recognition approach implemented: the design are stacked column-wise to generate a data matrix of 
INTEGRATION/OF UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES AND NAVAL 
SPECIAL WARFARE OPERATIONS, ~grztinuedfrom page 31 
as video and communications improve. 
Viewing a video feed in the field, during a foot: patrol, near a rarget area may 
not be as advantageous as having a C2 element (dedicated to viewing that feed) 
relay the information over a communications net capable of maintaining constant 
communications. (Note: the C2 element in the LOE was solely dedicated to 
observing and communicating with the single NSW element in the field). 
The ability ro track blue forces on the ground with a small tactical UAV 
has been demonstrated. The TR strobes utilized for the LOE purposes wer~p.ot 
clandestine enoughfor operational use during. ~g~cjal oge~:ttions, but th,!s r 
can be easily overcome. 
NSW forces can quickly adapt to the use of these new redmologies. Devt:.~opers 
of UAV s and their supporting technologies can benefit from feedback fromiopera-
rors in the field conducting LOEs. 
size 2700XN , where N represents the 
number of images in the training set. 
Next, PCA or LOA-based dimension 
reduction schemes create the projec-
tion matrix used to extract the class-
specific features needed for the clas-
sification step. 
Figure 6 presents a three-class 
training case, where the training data 
is split into three class-specific subsets. 
Next, PCA or LOA-based dimension 
reduction schemes are applied to 
extract the class-specific features , 







, respectively. Finally, 
each class is represented by its 
class-specific projected data centroid. 
--continued on page 55 
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During the testing stage, testing datasets are projected inro the feature 
space, using the projection matrix defined during the training stage, 
and their features compared against each class-specific cenrroid. Various 
class decision algorithms exist, and the minimum distance classifier was 
selected, where final class decision is made by selected for class with 
the centroid closest to the projected testing set features, as illustrated in 
Figure 7. 
T his proof of concept study showed that the uncooled 
IR image resolution is sufficient to discriminate between 
the 14 subjects currently enrolled in the database. Figure 
8 presenrs overall classification results obtained using 
a 60/40 cross-validation set-up and 1000 simulations, 
where the conrriburion of the top four eigenvectors is 
removed from the PCA projection matrix to improve 
the algorithm robustness to intensity variations. Results 
show bener performances for LDA than PCA based 
.. 
recognition schemes, as expected from their definitions. 1 
Further details may be found in Pereira [3]. Extensions !' .,.~.. .J. 
to the current work include expanding the database, and . 
investigating non-linear kernel-based projection schemes I 
for classification applications. "-----
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Figure 6 (top). Training 
(decision) stage. 
Figure 7 (above). Testing 
(decision) stage. 
Figure 8 (left). Overall clas-
sification performances 
for LOA and PCA (without 
the top four eigenvectors) 
implementations ; 60-40 
cross validation, 1000 sim-
ulations from [3]. 
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Ongoing work Research is currently dealing ";th a time-regime represen-
tation of power resro ration. Iris assumed thar. in the firs t 
few seconds after the attacks, all self-protecti\'e systems work 
properly, and evaluate the cost from that moment 
The power flow model we use is simplified ro a so-called D C 
representation of the full AC model , which neglectS reactive 
until the power is fully restored to normal. While 
lines and minor equipment can be repaired or 
replaced in days, or at most weeks, typical practice 
in the electric utility industry is to have only lim-
ired spares for expensive transformers. One issue 
anticipated is representing the tradeoff between the 
cost of owning additional spares and the reduction 
max mm cy 
li £.l 






CJ' l +C,!)'2+C.iJ3 
{ 
Ay, ~ B,8 
s.r. Ay2 ~ B28 
Ay3 ~ B38 
in repair time such spares would provide. 
Regarding computational efficiency of the 
algorithm, an optimal solution can be found (opti-
Table 1: Interdiction models: without time regimes (Model 1 a, left), 
and with time regimes (Model1 b, right) . (Linearizat ion of non- linear 
constraints in o is assumed.) 
mality verified through other means) to the afore-
mentioned interdiction problem in one minute on a 1GHz 
desktop computer. H owever, proving that this solution is 
actually optimal can rake much longer. Mathematically, the 
goal is to characterize exact optimality, or find right bounds 
on maximum error. Significant effort is being made to 
achieve these goals . 
Mathematical Aspects of the Interdiction Model 
T he basic model is viewed, without rime regimes, as in Model 
la in Table 1. In this model, 8 £D. represents resource-
constrained binary interdiction decisions for the terrorists, 
and y represents the optimal power flows, generation and load 
shedding. Remark: Although the original constraints in the 
inner minimization involve non-linear functions in 8, assume 
that a proper linearization of the problem is possible, so that 
the 8 's can be isolated on the right-hand side as shown. The 
computational difficulty of this model stems from the max-
min structure of the problem. The inner minimization is 
over a polytope that depends on 8 . Solution of the inner 
minimization as a function of 8 yields a convex function. 
Consequently, the outer maximization is over a convex func-
tion, which is, in general, computationally difficult. In addi-
tion, the domain for 8 is a discrete set, which turns the 
aforementioned convex function into a non-convex non-dif-
ferentiable one. 
Suppose this is extended to three scenarios representing 
different rime regimes. The resulting model is represented 
by Model 1 b in Table 1. This model is substantially larger, 
and will require the identification of extensive data to be 
reasonably accurate, and may require the development of new 
solution techniques. 
power effects. This entails various assumptions, many of 
which may be acceptable in the context of securi ty analysis 
bur more precise modeling may be necessary. For instance, 
we may also need to model non-linear losses, D C lines 
(e.g., the Oregon-California DC tie line) , transformer tap 
positions, transformer redundancy and connectivity at substa-
tions, capacitors, VAR compensators and synchronous con-
densers, unit commitment issues in the short-term , post-con-
tingency analysis, ere. 
As is normally the case in large-scale models, we need 
to find a compromise between model accuracy and tractabil-
ity. T he extent to which exact methodologies can be relied 
upon to solve the problem is limited as levels of decisions are 
aggregated and new modeling features are incorporated. 
An example of the research being performed, it is noted 
that Model l a ofTable 1 can be converted to 
max min cy + 8TBTPs 
o £ t. y,s 
s.t. { Ay ~ Is 
y,s2 0 
where Pis a diagonal matrix of penalties which represent 
upper bounds on dual variables. The inner minimization 
is now a concave problem in 8 and can be readily solved, 
in theory: The model can be converted to a mixed-integer 
program and solved directly, if it is not too large. (Note: 
The conversion just described is typically referred ro as "con-
vexification," although it is actually "concavificarion" in this 
case.) 
However, the penal ties represented by Pare nor easy to 
-continued on page 56 
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define in this complicated power-flow situation: If they 
are too large the model will be difficult to solve; and if 
they are too small, an incorrect solution will be obtained, 
perhaps with no indication that it is incorrect. The topic 
of "dynamic penalties" is being pursued where small initial 
penalties are defined and are increased within the branch-
and-bound solution algorithm, as needed. 
Learning the best way to attack electric grids allows 
better analysis of how to defend them. However, the first 
difficulty here is to determine a realistic set of protective 
measures, or "measure types," for consideration, from which 
the optimization analysis can recommend a selected number 
of specific actions to undertake. 
Mathematically, modeling protective measures entails 
adding a third level in the hierarchy of decisions to be 
made: 
max mm cy 
p £ p 0£/1(p) 
{ 
A(p)y :s; B(p)o 
S.t. y20 
In the above model, p £ P represents the set of feasible 
protective measures. Accordingly, terrorists will determine 
their strategy, O£!:J. (p), and the (improved) electric system 
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will determine load-shedding patterns after the attack. 
Finally, in many parts of the United States today, restruc-
turing of the electrici ty industry has led to an increased role 
of wholesale markets for electricity. An important ingre-
dient of successful electricity m arkets is the availability 
of sufficient transmission capacity to allow various genera-
tion resources to compete to sell energy. The transmiss ion 
capacity necessary for a vibrant market is typically more 
than was required in the pre-restructured industry, but in 
most jurisdictions there has been little transmission con-
struction in the las t decade. However, increased transmis-
sion capacity, through redundancy, can improve security 
while allowing greater access by competitors under normal 
conditions. Establishing an economic incentive for the 
utilities to create more secure networks may mean 
that the necessary construction will actually take place 
without government mandate. Part of the research will 
extend the m ax-min-max models to incorporate the value 
of improved competitiveness along with the val ue of 
reduced susceptibili ty to attacks. In doing so, dealing with 
how to compare low probability, high cost issues with 
certainties of protecting cos ts and new construction costs 
(which is being expanded to obtain market benefits) is 
anticipated. 
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